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The objective of this thesis is to examine the process
and managerial policies used for F-14 Standard Depot Level
Maintenance (SDLM) and compare it to the processes and
managerial policies for overhaul of the F/A-18 and for the
United Airlines 737. Efficiencies discovered in the F/A-18
and 737 overhaul processes that can be applied to reduce
the F-14 SDLM Turn Around Time (TAT) are identified.
The F-14 community faces the possibility of having
insufficient numbers of aircraft to satisfy fleet
requirements due to excessive SDLM TAT. A 50% reduction in
TAT would yield an increase of 10 to 11 aircraft available
for use per year. A TAT reduction of .10% is required by
the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1998 in order to
alleviate the premature retirement of approximately 10% of
the inventory (21 F-14 aircraft)
.
This research identifies areas for potential F-14 SDLM
TAT improvement pertaining to planning, pre-induction
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Global considerations impact virtually all strategic
decisions. The U.S. National. Security strategy requires a
quick and efficient response to all threats against both the
United States and its allies. Carrier Battle Groups and
associated assets are critical elements to providing air
supremacy in modern day littoral regions. Naval aviation
readiness is directly linked to the availability of both
aircraft and their components through cost efficient and
timely repair.
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) provides
an integrated system for performing aeronautical equipment
maintenance and related support functions. It was
established by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNQ) and
implemented by the Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, on 26
October 1959. The objective of the NAMP is to meet and
exceed aviation readiness and safety standards established
by CNO. This is accomplished by optimizing the use of
manpower, materials, facilities and financial resources in
accordance with policy guidance and technical direction
provided by the NAMP and other related directives. The
methodology . for meeting the objective is continuous process
improvement. Because of the dynamic nature of the program,
the NAMP has been periodically revised to incorporate
improved methods and techniques, such as the concept of
three levels of maintenance.
The NAMP is founded upon a ""three-level" maintenance
concept and is the authority governing the management of all
three levels. These levels are the Organizational level,
the Intermediate level, and the Depot level of aviation
maintenance. The NAMP provides the management tools
required for efficient and economical use of personnel and
material resources in performing maintenance at any of the
three levels. It also provides the basis for establishing
standard organizations, procedures, and responsibilities for
the accomplishment of all maintenance on naval aircraft,
associated material, and equipment.
The division of maintenance into three levels allows
management to:
(1) Classify maintenance functions by levels;
(2) Assign responsibility for maintenance functions to
a specific level;
(3) Assign maintenance tasks consistent with the
complexity, depth, scope, and range of work to be
performed;
(4) Accomplish any particular maintenance task or
support service at a level that ensures optimum
economic use of resources; and
(5) Collect, analyze, and use data to assist all
levels of NAMP management.
Organizational level (O-level) maintenance is performed
by an operating unit on a day-to-day basis in support of its
own operations. The maintenance mission is to maintain
assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a full
mission capable status while continually improving the local
maintenance process. While Intermediate level or Depot
level activities may do O-level maintenance, it is usually
accomplished by squadron maintenance personnel.
O-level maintenance functions generally can be grouped




(4) On-equipment corrective and preventive maintenance
including on-equipment repair, removal, and
replacement of defective components;
(5) Incorporation of Technical Directives within
prescribed limitations; and
(6) Record keeping and reports preparation.
Intermediate level (I-level) maintenance is the
responsibility of, and performed by, designated maintenance
activities in support of user organizations. The I-level
maintenance mission is to enhance and sustain the combat
readiness and mission capability of supported activities by
providing quality and timely material support at the nearest
location with the lowest practical resource expenditure.
I-level maintenance consists of both on and off equipment
material support and may be grouped as follows:
(1) Performance of maintenance on aeronautical
components and related support equipment;
(2) Calibration of designated equipment;
(3) Processing aircraft components from stricken
aircraft;
(4) Providing technical assistance to supported units;
(5) Incorporation of technical directives;
(6) Manufacture of selected aeronautical components/
liquids, and gases; and
(7) Performance of on-aircraft maintenance when
required.
Depot level (D-level) maintenance is performed at naval
aviation industrial establishments to ensure continued
flying integrity of airframes and flight systems during
subsequent operational service periods. D-level maintenance
is also performed on material requiring major overhaul or
rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end
items. It includes manufacturing parts, modifying, testing,
inspecting, sampling, and aircraft reclamation. D-level
maintenance supports O-level and I-levels of maintenance by
providing engineering assistance and performing maintenance
beyond their capabilities. D-level maintenance functions
may be grouped as follows:
(1) Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) of
aircraft;
(2) Rework, repair and modification of engines,
components, and support equipment;
(3) Calibration of instruments and other equipment by-
Navy calibration laboratories;
(4) Incorporation of technical directives;
(5) Manufacture or modification of parts or kits; and
(6) Technical and engineering assistance by field
teams
.
The Naval Aviation Depots are ' responsible to support
the organizational and intermediate level activities by
providing technical assistance and carrying out those
functions that are beyond the responsibility or capability
of the "0" or "I" level activities through the use of more
extensive facilities, skills and materials. Personnel
representing the depot carry out depot level services in
depots, or in the field. It is in this light that the term
"depot" represents both a capability and a facility.
(OPNAVINST 4790.2 series)
Naval Aviation Depots provide three general industrial
functions:
(1) They are involved with the rework of aviation end
items, systems and components;
(2) They are involved in the manufacture of items and
component parts otherwise not available or that
are cost prohibited; and
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(3) They are involved with support services which
include professional engineering, technology and
calibration services.
Rework of aircraft falls into three distinct categories
of maintenance functions, modification functions, and
special structural inspections. Maintenance functions are
those functions required to maintain or restore the inherent
designed service levels of performance, reliability, and
material condition. It involves the complete rebuild
through reclamation, refurbishment, overhaul, repair,
adjustment, servicing, replacement of system consumables,
and includes inspection, calibration, and testing.
Modification functions are those functions required to
change or improve design levels of performance, reliability,
and material condition. Special structural inspections are
performed by the depot to determine fatigue life
computations, technical directive compliance requirements
and any inspections that can not be performed by the "0" or
"I" levels due to a lack of skills, expertise or equipment.
(OPNAVINST 4790.2 series)
Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) Jacksonville, Florida, is
responsible for performing the coverage of F-14 SDLM
requirements. The Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM)
process is expected to identify material deficiencies and to
correct such deficiencies so that the aircraft can be
maintained at the organizational or intermediate level with
assurance of a high level of operational availability
through the next operating service period- Corrections of
deficiencies will be at the lowest authorized maintenance
level in accordance with OPNAVINST 4790. 2G Volume II,
Chapter 3. Correction of Depot Level deficiencies will be
corrected by the most economical means available. These
requirements include a thorough and comprehensive inspection
of selected aircraft structures, systems and components by
appropriate methods with defect correction, preventive
maintenance and modification requirements to ensure
serviceability of affected items through the next operating
service period. These requirements also include replacement
of depot level time-change components exceeding the
specified replacement intervals prior to the next scheduled
SDLM induction, as well as compliance with all outstanding
technical directives.
In the early 1970s, the Grumman F-14 Tomcat began
service to the fleet. In the System Maintenance Concept,
through Reliability and Maintainability data, operational
performance, and system/component design, Grumman Aerospace
determined an Operating Service Period (OSP) of 3 6 months
between SDLM visits. The OSP for the Tomcat was updated to
48 months and then again to 56 months in the early 1980s.
In an effort to save money by deferring depot level
maintenance until the material condition of the aircraft
warranted induction to SDLM, the Aircraft Service Period
Adjustment (ASPA) program was developed by the Naval
Aviation Logistics Center (NAVAVNLOGCEN ) in 1983. ASPA
involves an on-site inspection conducted by depot level
engineers to determine if SDLM is necessary. By adjusting
the criteria for SDLM induction from "on-schedule" to "on-
subjective-condition, " depot induction deferrals have become
the rule rather than the exception. Today, the average time
between SDLM' s is 8 years (56 month OSP + ASPA 4 average).
As a result of "rightsizing" the military
infrastructure, the Base Realignment and Closure Committee
(BRAC) , decided in 1993 to close NADEP Norfolk, Virginia.
The F-14 SDLM process transitioned to NADEP Jacksonville,
Florida, inducting the first F-14 Tomcat on October 1, 1994.
This change to the depot location has undoubtedly increased
the variability that currently plagues the SDLM process.
The effect of a "learning curve" has been prevented from
becoming fully optimized due to various changes to the flow,
work content and demand.
Finally, a major force that has also degraded the
process is the excessive NAVICP surcharge on parts or the
extreme cost of replacement parts when the depot has limited
Aviation Depot Level Repair (AVDLR) dollars available. This
has resulted in depots hiding demand and requirements from
NAVICP through the use of in-house repairs. This practice
has resulted in:





Hidden overhead and administrative costs.
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
The purpose of this research is to analyze and compare
the process of Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) of
the F-14 aircraft to both the F/A-18 Programmed Depot
Maintenance (PDM) process and to United Airlines commercial
aircraft overhaul procedures. Presently, the F-14
Turnaround Time (TAT) for SDLM at NADEP Jacksonville,
Florida is 14 to 16 months. The excessive TAT can be
attributed to a number of factors including:
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(1) The Operative Service Period (OSP) has grown from
3 6 months to 56 months.
(2) The Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) had
deferred SDLM inductions for an average of 4
years
.
(3) F-14 depot level repair relocated from NADEP
Norfolk, Virginia to NADEP Jacksonville, Florida.
(4) Depot avoidance of NAVICP surcharge through the
use of in-house repairs.
This research examines how a SDLM Master Plan and the
idea of "requisitioning versus repair" at the depot could
effect the variability of labor, materials, time and money
resulting in greater efficiency and effectiveness of the F-
14 overhaul process. An analysis of processes and practices
used at NADEP North Island, California, and the United
Airlines Maintenance Facility in San Francisco, California
will be applicable not only to the F-14 aircraft, but to
other naval aircraft overhaul processes.
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
This thesis is a comparative analysis of the overhaul
processes and procedures at each NADEP. Each current
production process is diagrammed and measured. Areas for
process improvements at NADEP Jacksonville, Florida, are
11
identified, and potential improvements analyzed with their
impact on cost, system availability, ' and inventory
requirements forecasted. The lessons learned are summarized
for future aircraft programs and other areas for DOD use.
Additionally, process improvements based on industry
best practices are analyzed for possible incorporation into
the F-14 overhaul process. These process improvements are
prioritized by their ability to decrease the process
variability, to have positive effects on TAT, and to be
effectively implemented within the structure of NADEP.
These process improvements are identified through the
analysis of data from actual commercial industry
applications. This provides a quantifiable measurement of
the system currently utilized by NADEP.
D . METHODOLOGY
The F-14 SDLM repair process and data are documented
through the study of current NADEP procedures and interviews
with NADEP Jacksonville, Florida, personnel. A comparative
analysis was conducted through research and interviews with
technical experts from NADEP North Island, and United
Airlines. Additional interviews included individuals from
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the Navy
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) . The literature review
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includes trade publications, DOD and industry technical
manuals, and periodicals.
The researchers identify areas for improvement within
the current F-14 SDLM process. Incorporating and analyzing
maintenance data from other industry "best practices" shows
specific improvements and serves as the basis for process
improvement forecasts. The researchers extend the
information derived from this data to forecast possible
improvements in NADEP Jacksonville's TAT.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides a background of how the SDLM
process has changed over the years by defining it,
explaining why it has changed, and explaining the hoped-for
benefits of reduced TAT.
Chapter III examines and compares the processes and
management practices at NADEP Jacksonville, Florida, with
NADEP North Island, California, and United Airlines.
Chapter IV is a comparative analysis of the three
overhaul processes using historical and projected amounts of
materials, labor, total costs and time.
Chapter V presents a clear and concise summary of the
conclusions and recommendations that are drawn from the
research. Additionally, an evaluation of the efficiency,
13
effectiveness and benefits of workable solutions of the SDLM
process at
.
NADEP Jacksonville, Florida, is provided.
Finally, this chapter presents suggestions for areas of
further research.
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II. STANDARD DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
(SDLM)
A. BACKGROUND
Naval Aviation Depots provide three general industrial
functions: Rework, Manufacture and Support Services. First,
they are involved with the rework of aviation end items,
systems and components. Second, they are involved in the
manufacture of items and component parts not otherwise
available or that are cost prohibitive. Third, they are
involved with support services which include professional
engineering, technology, and calibration services. As this
thesis research focuses on the rework process of the F-14
Tomcat, there is a need to provide a definition of rework.
Rework is comprised of both maintenance and
modification functions. Maintenance functions are those
functions required to maintain or restore the inherent
designed service levels of performance, reliability, and
material condition. These functions span the complete
rebuild of the aircraft through reclamation, refurbishment,
overhaul, repair, adjustment, servicing, and replacement of
system consumables. They also include inspection,
15
calibration, and testing of those systems. Modification
functions are those functions required to change or improve
design levels of performance, reliability, and material
condition. It also includes alteration, conversion,
engineering changes, and modernization of aircraft.
(OPNAVINST 4790.2 series)
The first F-14 Tomcat requiring Standard Depot Level
Maintenance (SDLM) was inducted into the Naval Aviation
Depot (NADEP) , Norfolk, Virginia in 1975. In 1982, the F-14
SDLM effort was expanded to include NADEP North Island,
California, as a second F-14 aircraft overhaul site. In
1991, F-14 depot maintenance process was reverted back to a
single site location and conducted in Norfolk, Virginia.
NADEP North Island, California, completed its last SDLM
overhaul on 26 April 1992. In 1993, the Base Realignment
and Closure Committee (BRAC) decided to close NADEP Norfolk,
Virginia. The F-14 SDLM process was subsequently
transitioned to NADEP Jacksonville, Florida, where the- first
F-14 Tomcat was inducted on October 1, 1994. NADEP
Jacksonville, Florida, completed their first F-14 SDLM on 16
January 1996.
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B. SDLM MASTER PLAN
Each Type/Model/Series aircraft in the Navy inventory
is assigned an Operational Service Period, (OSP) per
OPNAVINST 3110. 11T. The OSP defines the minimum time period
between SDLM and "provides the basis for planning,
programming, and budgeting for a particular aircraft."
(OPNAVINST 3110. 11T) In the case of the F-14, the initial
OSP was 36 months. After this initial OSP was reached,
aircraft were inducted into the overhaul process.
Inspections of the first few aircraft provided reliability,
maintainability and operational performance data which
resulted in the recommendation of extending the F-14 OSP
from 36 to 48 months. The same results occurred again at
the 48 month OSP, which resulted in a second OSP adjustment
in the late 1970s to the current time frame of 56 months.
In 1982, the Naval Aviation Logistics Center was driven
by a desire to avoid inducting aircraft of sound material
condition into the overhaul process in an effort to save
valuable fiscal resources. Consequently, the Department of
the Navy instituted the Aircraft Service Period Adjustment,
(ASPA) program. This program involved an in-depth
inspection, conducted by depot level industrial engineers,
to determine if a SDLM was warranted. The purpose of this
evaluation was to provide a means of determining the need to
17
induct an aircraft for depot level maintenance, based on
material condition, flight time, Period End Date (PED) and
other factors. By adjusting the criteria for SDLM induction
from "on-schedule" to "on subjective-condition, " depot
induction deferrals through the ASPA inspection became the
rule rather than the exception.
Today, the results of this ASPA program plague the F-14
community. On average, an F-14 aircraft operates in the
fleet for approximately 8 years before it is inducted into
SDLM. As an example, through this increased operation in
the fleet, the depot is experiencing an increasing number of
delamination problems on the flight control surfaces of the
aircraft. This problem is above and beyond the current SDLM
specifications and has consequently increased the TAT of the
aircraft at the depot. Another major consequence of the
ASPA program is the resulting complexity of the planning and
scheduling process for F-14 aircraft inductions to SDLM.
There is a high degree of variability and uncertainty
regarding the labor and material required as .well as the
number of aircraft inducted into SDLM each year. Finally,
the actual total costs associated with SDLM process has
averaged 25.1 percent higher than the estimated total costs
due to the uncertainty of the condition of each aircraft
inducted.
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Deferring F-14 Standard Depot Level Maintenance
resulted in a tremendous backlog of rework that not only
possessed the aforementioned problems, but also created a
scheduling and capacity problem that could not be easily
overcome by NADEP Jacksonville, Florida. As a result, a
revised SDLM Master Plan as shown in Appendix A was created
in an effort to identify those aircraft that met the
criteria for potential continued service through the year
2008 versus those aircraft whose structural and material
condition would not be of benefit to the sustained readiness
requirements for the fleet. Although ASPA inspections are
still conducted at fleet units, the results of the
inspections are utilized only to identify safety of flight
discrepancies and not to identify candidates for SDLM
induction.
C. THE SDLM SPECIFICATION
The SDLM specification is a document that establishes
the overhaul requirements for naval aircraft. This
specification establishes the Standard Depot Level
Maintenance (SDLM) requirements for the Navy F-14A, F-14B,
and F-14D series aircraft. The requirements of SDLM are
determined based on systematic analysis of airframe, systems
and component design, their operational performance and
19
Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) data. The SDLM
process is expected to identify material deficiencies and to
correct such deficiencies so that the aircraft can be
maintained at the organizational or intermediate level with
assurance of a high level of operational availability
through the next Operating Service Period. The SDLM





(3) SDLM Functional Flight Check and Government
Acceptance;
(4) Component Removal and Replacement;
(5) Maintenance Requirements Card Inspections Not
Accomplished at SDLM; and
(6) SDLM Reports.
Section I of the SDLM specification contains general
information concerning the purpose and scope of the SDLM
process, SDLM intervals, definitions of the terminology used




Section II contains the minimum technical depot level
scheduled maintenance requirements. It also contains
information concerning unscheduled maintenance requirements
which are discovered as a result of visual zonal
examinations, operational/functional testing of systems
and/or review of aircraft logbooks and records.
Section III provides and identifies SDLM operations,
check flight and acceptance requirements, operational
checks, weight and balance verifications, aircraft inventory
requirements, logs and records verifications and test flight
requirements to be accomplished subsequent to the scheduled
depot maintenance.
Section IV is a compilation of the scheduled component
removal/replacement criteria contained in Section II and
provides the authorized disposition of any replaced
components
.
Section V identifies the Maintenance Requirement Card
(MRC) tasks which are not performed during SDLM processing.
The purpose of this section is to facilitate rescheduling of
an aircraft into the organizational level inspection cycle
after SDLM completion.
Section VI describes the various engineering reports
which are to be submitted to the F-14 Fleet Support Team
(F-14 FST) by the aviation depot or contractor subsequent to
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government acceptance of each aircraft that has completed
SDLM.
D. MODIFICATIONS TO THE SDLM SPECIFICATION
The 1992 SDLM specifications included 154 structural
inspections and 104 system performance checks. In 1994, the
SDLM specification was reduced to reflect 83 structural
inspections and 39 system performance checks. This equates
to approximately a 53 percent reduction of the work
previously performed. In 1997, the structural checks were
increased from 83 to 90 while the systems checks dropped
from 39 to 30. However, there were 5 modification
procedures added to the specification.
There are two diametrically opposite viewpoints on
these reductions. There are those individuals within the
naval aviation maintenance community who oppose these
changes and those individuals within the same community who
favor the changes. Those that are opposed to these
reductions consist primarily of squadron and functional wing
managers who must now conduct the maintenance actions
deleted from the specification. This group's opinion is
based on the resulting increased workload that is placed on
squadron personnel although the current manning levels can
not support the workload. Additionally, these managers have
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valid concerns about the ability of sailors to perform these
maintenance actions without any previous training or
experience. This could possibly lead to maintenance errors
and potential harm to the aircrew.
Those individuals within the aviation maintenance
community that endorse these reductions believe that the
majority of these systems checks can be conducted by
organizational level expertise and therefore should be
conducted at the lowest level possible. Conducting these
systems checks at the Depot level not only increases the
overall costs and TAT of the SDLM process, but also creates
a culture of squadrons routinely deferring maintenance
actions that would eventually be accomplished at the depot.
Finally, given the current reductions to DOD budgets and
downsizing of the late 1980s and early 1990s, depot funding
levels can no longer support maintenance actions that should
be accomplished at the organizational level. However, as
shown in the data, these specification deletions reduced
neither the overall costs nor the TAT of the F-14 SDLM
process
.
E. BENEFITS OF REDUCED TURN AROUND TIME
Improved fleet aviation readiness should be the
ultimate goal of any activity regardless of its individual
23
mission. The reduction of NADEP repair (TAT) is paramount
in not- only maintaining the necessary operational readiness
requirements for the fleet, but also in reducing the Navy's
total overhaul expenditures. Whether receiving,
disassembling, repairing, assembling, or testing, each step
in the repair cycle should strive to enhance readiness. The
only significant avenue NADEPs have in enhancing fleet
readiness is
(
through reducing their repair TAT.
Consequently, any incremental reduction in repair TAT
realized through reducing unnecessary procedures or through
process pipeline improvements will result in a direct
benefit to the fleet.
The benefits of reducing the TAT of the F-14 overhaul
process are extensive and beneficial for not only the NADEP,
but also for the fleet commanders. Reducing repair TAT
equates to additional utilization of the aircraft by fleet
components as the aircraft consequently spend less time in
the repair cycle. This reduction also yields an increased
capacity for the depot which affords them the opportunity to
acquire additional workload and maintain their technology
base. Decreasing TAT also reduces the overall repair cost
per aircraft. These savings can then be applied towards
additional aircraft overhaul and repair. Finally, an
increase in capacity affords the opportunity for more
24
inductions which results in more available work for the
production personnel and will subsequently improve morale.
Therefore, the reduction of TAT for the F-14 SDLM process
benefits not only the fleet commanders, but also those





This chapter compares the overhaul processes for the
F-14, F/A-18 and United Airlines 737 aircraft. Each of the
three processes begins with a flow diagram, followed by a
detailed description of the process. Subsequent to the
description, observations on the current philosophies and
practices are made. These areas are divided into three
distinct categories: Planning, Buy versus Route versus
Store, and Culture.
B. PROCESS AT NADEP JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA
The following flow diagram displays the fourteen phases
of the F-14 overhaul process conducted at NADEP
Jacksonville, Florida. The scheduled number of workdays
that each phase is expected to complete is also included in
the diagram.
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F-14 Tomcat Overhaul Process
Induction/
Preserve ^> Pre Strip Phase =} Strip Phase ^> PrimePhase ^> Post Strip


















32 Days 22 Days 5 Days Total of 249 Days
1. The F-14 Overhaul Process
The TAT for the F-14 overhaul process begins when the
aircraft arrives from the squadron to NADEP's test line.
The initial phase is the Induction/Preserve Phase. NADEP
personnel review the aircraft logbooks and Aircraft
Discrepancy Book (ADB) in order to familiarize themselves
with the maintenance history of the aircraft. Concurrently,
the aircraft's engines are operated and a complete systems
check is accomplished in order to determine a base line for
the aircraft. This base line identifies any specific,
inherent features of the aircraft as well as any
malfunctions related to that particular aircraft. At this
point, the aircraft is defueled, and the next phase begins.
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The Pre-Strip Phase starts with the removal of the
engines and primary heat exchange unit. Both aircraft
engines and the heat exchange unit are preserved and stored
in climate controlled buildings to protect them from
humidity.
After Pre-strip, the aircraft is towed from the test
flight line to the paint removal building for the Strip
Phase. During this phase the paint is chemically removed
using brushes and solvent. The allotted time for this phase
is five days. However, the actual time to complete this
phase averages approximately eight days. The reason for
this three-day schedule slip is due to excessive layers of
paint that often cannot be removed chemically. This results
in time-consuming efforts to manually sand and grind
particular areas of the aircraft.
Upon being stripped to bare metal, a light green primer
coating is applied to the aircraft. The aircraft is then
towed from the strip hangar to the main SDLM hangar, where
it is stationed for the majority of the SDLM process. All
aircraft remain in the same location and artisans move from
aircraft to aircraft completing various repairs and
modifications as required.
Once in the SDLM hangar, the Post-Strip Phase begins.
This includes opening all aircraft panels, disassembling the
29
aircraft, removing the major avionics components, as well as
both the Pilot and Radar Intercept Officer ejection seats.
In the disassembly of the aircraft, the wings and both sets
of vertical and horizontal stabilators are removed and sent
to the component shop for inspection and any necessary
repairs.
Noting all discrepancies above and beyond those
identified during the ASPA inspection is the responsibility
of the Examiners and Evaluators (E&E) . It is at this point
where a determination is made as to which discrepancies are
in fact Depot-level responsibilities, and which
discrepancies are Organizational or Intermediate level
responsibilities. Discrepancies that are deemed correctable
at the two lower levels of maintenance are labeled as "Noted
But Not Corrected" (NBNC) discrepancies.
The Metal Repairs/Modifications Phase is allotted
approximately 104 days TAT. The actual time to complete
this phase averages 152 days. Although this phase is
allotted the greatest amount of time, the actual work in
direct support of SDLM is minor. The majority of the work
involves incorporation of major Airframe Changes (AFCs)
.
The most common AFCs that are currently incorporated are:
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- 5K and 7K upgrades that are incorporated as the
aircraft reaches 5,000 and 7,000 flight hours
respectively;
- AFC 794/795, ALR-67 Upgrade;
- AFC 844, Modification for the Tactical Airborne
Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) and Digital Tarps
capability;
- AFC 859, Wing Crack Repair; and
- AFC 873, Replacement of Fuselage Station 353 Frame.
After all modifications and repairs are completed, the
Assembly 1 Phase begins. This phase includes assembling the
aircraft to the point where the fuel cells are installed and
capable of holding fuel. A Fuel Cell (Wet Check) Phase is
then conducted and includes fueling the aircraft to
capacity, and performing fuel transfer checks and fuel leak
checks. Additionally, during this phase, the engine inlet
ducts are painted as a matter of a time saving convenience
as the engines are not yet installed.
The Assembly 2 Phase requires the aircraft to be fully
assembled with the exception of aircraft panels. This
includes reinstalling both wings as well as both sets of
vertical and horizontal stabilators, the engines and the
heat exchange unit. The Final Close Operations Phase
includes applying electrical power to perform
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electronic/avionics system checks, operating aircraft
landing gear as well as installing the Pilot and Radar
Intercept Officer ejection seats.
The Ground Check/Flight Test Phase includes
installation of all access doors along with the remaining
aircraft panels onto the aircraft. A Low-Power-Turn-Up
(LPTU) and High-Power-Turn-Up (HPTU) is performed on the
aircraft. After each turn-up is complete, any discovered
discrepancies are fixed and the aircraft is scheduled for a
Post-Maintenance Check Flight. Aircrews assigned to NADEP
perform the check flight and record the results.
Upon successful completion of the test flight, the
aircraft is towed to the paint hangar for the Clean and
Final Paint Phase. During this phase, the aircraft is
thoroughly cleaned and receives a final nose-to-tail paint-
job. No special or customized paint schemes other than
normal exterior markings and insignias as directed by the
appropriate maintenance manuals are authorized.
After the paint process is completed, the aircraft
logbooks and Aircraft Discrepancy Book are reviewed and
annotated for transfer back to the squadron. A Ready- for
Issue (RFI) aircraft is then flown back to the fleet
squadron where it is put back into operational service.
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2 . Management Philosophy and Practices
a) Planning
The F-14 SDLM program has been plagued with
process variability introduced by the ASPA program. It is
only through accurate and proper planning that variability
can be reduced to allow for a more efficient and effective
SDLM process.
A considerable planning issue that must be
addressed is the ability of the customer to request
additional work content in the form of time consuming
Airframe Changes (AFCs) . Currently, the customer is able to
request the incorporation of additional AFCs up to four
months after the induction date of the aircraft. This
practice, while handled on a case-by-case basis, introduces
more variability, uncertainty and results in reactive
planning in the F-14 SDLM program. A loss of process
control results, making it more difficult to achieve both
cost and TAT requirements. These resulting additions to the
workload are the major contributing factors to the current
average 48 day increase in TAT during the
Metal/Repair/Modification Phase since they affect the
availability of tooling, kits, and staffing. Reduction or
elimination of this variability should result in better
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process control and a reduction of the TAT for the
Metal/Repair/Modification Phase.
Also of major concern are long-range staff
planning and the need to set priorities in order to
determine the allocation of internal resources. The current
practices of approving regular leave of shop and work floor
artisans only to reguest overtime upon their return to make
up for lost production should be discontinued. This
practice increases the variability of the overhaul process
since there is not a consistent guantity of personnel
available on a daily basis. Workload planning and
scheduling becomes ineffective as a result of this
variability and actual TAT to complete the work exceeds the
expected TAT.
Additionally, the workload priorities among the
various component repair shops should be aligned to the
priorities of completing the overall SDLM process on time
and not to completing a predetermined amount of items within
a specific reporting period. Currently, component repair
shops are expected to complete only a specific guantity of
items per reporting period and not necessarily the specific
components that will allow an aircraft in the overhaul
process to proceed to the next phase. This introduces
additional variability into the SDLM process since there is
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no asset visibility. Consequently, SDLM process managers do
not always know when components will return for
installation. Elimination of this variability will
facilitate better SDLM process control and should reduce the
overall TAT.
b) Buy versus Route versus Store
After the aircraft is disassembled in the Post
Strip Work Phase, the Examiners and Evaluators (E&E) make a
determination as to which aircraft components will be
bought, which will be routed to depot back-shops, and which
will be stored in an inventory warehouse until
reinstallation on the same aircraft later in the SDLM
process
.
The F-14 SDLM program has been plagued with
consistent parts shortages as a result of supply not meeting
demand or total requirement. An excessive Navy Inventory
Control Point (NAVICP) surcharge on parts has resulted in
the NADEP trying to meet requirements by routing components
to the back-shops for repair. The NAVICP surcharge pays for
NAVICP overhead expenses. This surcharge is calculated by
spreading yearly expenses over forecasted sales to arrive at
a percentage "tax", which is currently 57 percent. This
surcharge consists of:





Price Stabilization and Inflation,
Inventory Management,
Depreciation of Capital Assets, and
Profits or Losses from Previous Fiscal Year.
Because the surcharge is perceived as too high,
the results are in a "Component Death Spiral". This cause
and effect situation is created when depots either avoid
using NAVICP and/or buy less replacement items than
expected. This results in NAVICP overhead not being
reimbursed because expected buys did not occur.
Consequently, NAVICP raises its surcharge the next year to
cover these losses and the next year's overhead. This cycle
repeats itself and gets progressively worse over time.
Another contributing factor to the slip in TAT is
that approximately sixty-five percent of back-shop
components are not delivered on time to the SDLM production
line. Additionally, routed components often get overhauled
when a complete overhaul of the item is neither necessary'
nor warranted.
Finally, Total Asset Visibility (TAV) is lost as
components are sent to back-shops for repair. Components
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are viewed as a single entity and lose identity from the
aircraft in which they belong. Back-shop personnel are
simply concerned with meeting quarterly repair quotas and
are not concerned with the resulting implications of not
completing items that will support the SDLM production line.
c) Culture
An inherent problem exists within the culture of
NADEP Jacksonville, Florida. There is a lack of incentive
to save money or reduce turn-around time (TAT) on back-shop
routed items. It should further be noted that there is
little incentive for NADEP to use NAVICP as their surcharges
have forced customers to look for other alternatives.
Additionally, this results in NAVICP not accurately
forecasting future requirements.
The depot is dependent on overtime. In numerous
instances, employees have requested and taken unscheduled
non-emergency annual leave during the week prior to weekend
overtime. Routine annual leave is very rarely prescheduled.
Furthermore, the apparent slow down of work to gain overtime
in order to accomplish the task is hurting credibility and
crippling the depot's ability to meet set plans and
goals/commitments. This results in production delays and
additional costs in four ways: 1) there is not enough
manpower available to meet the expected production
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requirements for the week, 2) those artisans on leave
receive their pay, 3) NADEP pays additional money for the
overtime, and 4) the amount of completed overtime does not
return the process to its schedule. These four factors
result in an increase in the overall costs and TAT of the
SDLM process.
C. PROCESS AT NADEP NORTH ISLAND, CALIFORNIA
The following flow diagram displays the eight phases of
the F/A-18 overhaul process. Process efficiency is realized
through concurrency during the Disassembly and Evaluation,
Repair and Modification and Assembly Phases. The scheduled
number of workdays that each phase is expected to complete
is also included in the diagram.
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1. The F/A-18 Overhaul Process
The TAT of the F/A-18 overhaul process begins when the
aircraft arrives from the squadron to NADEP' s test line.
The initial phase is the Induction Phase. Upon arrival, the
pilot thoroughly debriefs NADEP test flight line personnel
to identify any systems problems that are not already
annotated in either the aircraft logbook or the Aircraft
Discrepancy Book (ADB) . The pilot debrief and the
subsequent screening of the logbooks provides NADEP
personnel the first opportunity to schedule any necessary
maintenance on the aircraft' s systems while it undergoes the
overhaul process in the maintenance facility. At this
point, test flight personnel complete a full systems check
of the aircraft, including engine operation, to verify those
discrepancies identified by the pilot and determine an
initial baseline for the aircraft. Also during this time, a
verification check of easily accessible technical directives
and/or modifications is accomplished in order to verify the
incorporation of those changes without major disassembly of
the aircraft. These procedures provide NADEP with the
ability to review the aircraft from both a systems
perspective as well as a technical modification perspective
and afford them the opportunity to identify those systems
and modifications that may need attention or incorporation
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during the overhaul process. After this process is
complete, the aircraft is 100 percent defueled and preserved
in accordance with applicable maintenance directives.
From the test flight line, the aircraft is moved to the
painting facility where a material condition evaluation is
conducted. During this evaluation, the exterior of the
aircraft is reexamined for evidence of poor paint adhesion,
blisters, cracking, erosion and excessive paint thickness.
These areas are initially identified and treated, if
necessary, to prevent any further deterioration.
Additionally, a determination is made as to what corrective
action and subsequent paint requirements will be
accomplished after completion of the overhaul process. The
aircraft is subsequently moved to the maintenance facility
to begin the Disassembly and Evaluation Phase.
Once inside the maintenance facility, the aircraft is
parked in a predetermined spot where it remains for the
duration of the overhaul process. An Examination and
Evaluation (E&E) inspection is then completed concurrently
with the disassembly of the aircraft. A more efficient
aircraft overhaul process is realized as NADEP engineers
evaluate certain aircraft components for possible repair
actions while the disassembly phase continues concurrently.
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The E&E portion of the overhaul process is the most
critical in terms of repair TAT for the F/A-18. It is
during this phase that the entire aircraft is evaluated for
repair procedures that are "over and above" what is required
within the overhaul specifications. The entire
specification requires approximately 1900 labor-hours to
complete while the "over and above" discrepancies average an
additional 5100 labor-hours. During the E&E portion of this
phase, estimated repair times are determined as well as the
amount of repair necessary for each section of the aircraft.
The evaluators consult with NADEP structural engineers to
determine exact repair procedures for areas that are not
usually suspect to either rework or repair. Finally, during
E&E, all technical directives and modifications that are
designated as depot level maintenance actions are verified
for incorporation. If it is discovered during this sight
verification that certain depot level directives or
modifications have not been incorporated, the E&E team will
investigate the availability of parts and tooling for that
specific directive or modification. If the modification has
been deemed critical to the safety of flight or structural
integrity of the aircraft, it is automatically incorporated
into the overhaul schedule. If it is not considered
critical, but it is determined that the parts, tooling,
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personnel, and necessary time is available to incorporate
that modification without jeopardizing the scheduled -TAT,
then that particular modification is scheduled for
incorporation
.
Disassembly of the aircraft consists of removing
components and structures of the aircraft to facilitate
maintenance actions on either the airframe or on the
component itself during the repair phase of the overhaul
process. Only those items identified for removal to
facilitate other maintenance actions and those components
that need repair as determined through either historical
data or evaluation are actually removed. No additional
components are removed unless a specific need is identified.
Items that are removed only to facilitate airframe
inspection and repair are labeled and placed in storage
until needed in the assembly phase. Airframe structures and
components that are removed for specific inspection and
repair are sent to the appropriate artisan within- the
maintenance facility for completion.
Once the E&E portion of the Disassembly and Evaluation
Phase is completed, the Repair and Modification Phase
begins. This is not an indication that the disassembly of
the aircraft is 100 percent complete or that the disassembly
process is inefficient. Instead, it is another indication
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of the overall maintenance philosophy at NADEP North Island
where concurrency is paramount. ' During the Repair and
Modification Phase, all structural repairs and modifications
of the airframe take place. Although this phase is allotted
the greatest amount of time, the actual work in direct
support of the overhaul specifications is minor. The
majority of work involves incorporation of various technical
directives and modifications depending on the age and
current configuration of the aircraft, as well as structural
repair due to corrosion. The majority of the F/A-18 TAT
time is exhausted during this phase of the overhaul process..
As soon as it is practical, the Assembly Phase begins
although there may still be a significant amount of work
remaining in the Repair and Modification Phase. Again, this
is accomplished through the cooperative efforts of the two
foremen responsible for these two phases of the overhaul
process. They ensure that there are no conflicts between
the various artisans responsible for specific phase tasks.
While the aircraft is reassembled and the components
installed, it undergoes as many electrical systems checks as
possible prior to being towed to the test flight line for
the Systems Test Phase. The electrical systems of the F/A-
18 are extremely complex and this "pre-testing" allows for
more accurate and quicker troubleshooting if there is an
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electrical degradation. The electrical system "pre-testing"
reduce's the TAT of the F/A-18, as the aircraft is still
located within the maintenance facility with the majority of
the electricians available to assist in solving the problem.
The aircraft is the towed to the test flight line where is
undergoes the Systems Check phase of the overhaul process.
Upon receipt of the aircraft at the test flight line
for the Systems Check and Test Flight Phases, the aircraft
is depreserved, refueled, and a full systems check is
performed to ensure compliance with operational
specifications. If there are system problems, test flight
line personnel either repair the problem or artisans from
the overhaul production line are called out to troubleshoot
and repair the discrepancy. Once the aircraft successfully
completes all of the systems checks, it is then ready for
test flight. Aircrews assigned to NADEP perform a Post-
Maintenance Check Flight and record the results. Upon
successful completion of the test flight, the aircraft is
towed to the paint facility for clean and final, paint.
During the Paint Phase, the aircraft is prepared for
and receives the paint requirements that were determined
during the Induction Phase. The paint requirements do not
dictate a complete nose-to-tail painting but instead, only
provide for major touch up and zonal painting. The intent
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is to utilize the most effective and economical means to
restore the exterior paint finish and not to necessarily
repaint the entire aircraft. Additionally, no special or
customized paint schemes other than normal exterior markings
and insignias as directed by the appropriate maintenance
manuals are authorized.
After the paint process is completed, the aircraft
logbooks and Aircraft Discrepancy Book are reviewed and
annotated for transfer back to the squadron. The aircraft
is then flown back to the fleet squadron where it is put
back into operational service.
2 . Management Philosophies and Practices
a) Planning
The F/A-18 program was initially plagued with
significant planning problems that resulted in NADEP North
Island, California, losing the depot level maintenance
contract to Air Force depots in 1991. The F/A-18 program
manager and his staff realized that many significant changes
had to occur if future F/A-18 overhaul contracts were to be
awarded to NADEP North Island. Some of these changes
included a proactive versus reactive management philosophy,
better coordinated planning and scheduling between all of
the steps in the process, and finally, computer-scheduling
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software specifically tailored to meet the needs of NADEP
schedulers and planners.
Due to these management changes, NADEP North
Island won the depot level maintenance contract back from
the Air Force. The F/A-18 production office at NADEP North
Island initiated full and open communication with their
customers and began to plan for aircraft before they
physically arrived at their facility. This planning process
includes identifying all aircraft being inducted for the
quarter no later than 30 days prior to the start of the
quarter. This allows the planners and schedulers to order
the necessary modification kits, any special tooling and
equipment as well as identify any specific maintenance
requirements that a particular aircraft may have upon
induction. The result has been a greater than 50 percent
reduction in the estimated TAT for the aircraft from
estimations made before these changes occurred. (Appendix B)
b) Buy versus Route versus Store
The F/A-18 overhaul process is specific in its
philosophy of buy versus route versus store. Concurrent
rework/overhaul of repairable components beyond
organizational and intermediate level is not authorized
during depot level maintenance of aircraft unless supply
system Ready for Issue (RFI) assets are not available or the
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supply system response will cause work stoppage (NAVAIR F/A-
18 MCAPP Specification) . The senior managers of 'the F/A-18
overhaul process initially attempted to follow this concept,
but found through previous historical data as well as recent
experiences that it was actually more economical to purchase
the components needed through an outside source when faced
with an unresponsive supply system instead of attempting
repair within their own organization as implied in the MCAPP
specification. They found that more than 50 percent of the
time, components could be procured either through NAVICP or
an outside vendor faster than they could be repaired. This
philosophy of buying versus routing of components helps to
minimize the self-inflating tax associated with the
"Component Death Spiral" experienced in the F-14 community.
Additionally, there were numerous instances where
valuable TAT was expended trying to repair components, only
to have those components returned from the component shop
because the items were either beyond economical repair or
the lead time for replacement sub-components was excessive.
Any component that functions normally during the induction
phase full systems check and has not exceeded is fatigue
life is removed, preserved and stored until re-assembly of
the aircraft.
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Finally, there is very little cannibalization of
stored parts unless 'the availability of a particular part is
non-existent and all available means of expeditiously
procuring the item have been exhausted.
c) Culture
There is a very strong business-minded culture
within the F/A-18 overhaul process. There are no "stovepipe
organizations" within the process and all information is
open and available for review and analysis by anyone
involved in the process. For example, personnel managing
the F/A-18 overhaul program use a planning and scheduling
program called PDMSS (Planned Depot Maintenance Scheduling
System) . This system was custom built and tailored to the
needs of NADEP personnel involved in managing the overhaul
process. This leadership umbrella spans from the Program
Manager to the various crew leaders assigned to oversee
specific maintenance tasks. PDMSS tracks every evolution of
the overhaul process from the initial ordering of materials,
to the status of current work in progress, to the amount of
completed labor hours by a specific artisan for a particular
job. PDMSS is regarded as an evolving software package that
is continuously improved and updated in order to accommodate
its users. Everyone from the Program Manager to the foremen
responsible for each phase within the process have access to
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all the same information. No one is able to withhold
information since it is readily available within PDMSS. The
result is free and open communication within the working
environment that results in not only more cooperation
between those involved in the process, but also a
realization of a common goal. That goal is to minimize the
impact on the customer by returning a quality product on
time so that the fleet squadron can accomplish their
mission.
Another culture feature within the F/A-18 overhaul
program is the free flow and horizontal flow of
communication within the organization. Daily production
meetings are conducted to review and update the specific
status on each aircraft in detail. Three times a week,
these meetings are conducted on the production floor and the
other two days, they are held in a conference room. This
philosophy of "going to the process" provides the artisans
on the floor with a sense of commitment from the F/A-18
management team that they are concerned about the overall
process. In addition, the Program Manager holds monthly
meetings with all personnel to provide them with updated
information concerning the program and reply to their
feedback and concerns. Consequently, every individual knows
exactly what has recently happened, what is currently going
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on, what is being planned for the' immediate future, as well
as what is expected from them in order to continue to
improve the overall production effort.
D. PROCESS AT UNITED AIRLINES
Although it is inequitable to compare a non-tactical,
commercial aircraft designed for transporting passengers to
a tactical military jet designed for supersonic flight, it
is the researchers' opinion that the process by which
commercial aircraft are overhauled could present valuable
insight and information for improvement of the current
overhaul processes for military aircraft. It is with this
reasoning in mind that this research was conducted in order
to identify potential aspects of the commercial overhaul
process that could be applied to the NADEP processes-.
The following flow diagram displays the 6 phases of the
United Airlines 737 aircraft overhaul process. It should be
noted that these aircraft are not painted during the
overhaul process. Instead, they are independently scheduled
to be painted by an outside contractor. However, in order
to account for the painting process time and to allow for an
equitable comparison between all three processes, the TAT
for painting United Airlines 737 aircraft is included in the
flow diagram.
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1. The Boeing 737 Overhaul Process
The overhaul process for the Boeing 737 at United
Airlines begins with the induction of the aircraft at a
predetermined maintenance bay at the overhaul facility. The
aircraft is towed into a hangar that has been configured
ahead of time to receive the aircraft. Based on historical
data of Heavy Maintenance Visits (HMV) , all maintenance
support equipment, including personnel stands, are moved
into position to begin the Disassembly, Inspection and
Repair Phase, which consists of opening all compartments for
component removal, inspection and evaluation.
During this phase, the interior of the aircraft is
gutted of all seats, panels and other equipment.
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Additionally, all aircraft components that have been
predetermined to require replacement' during the overhaul
process are also removed. This affords the inspectors the
opportunity to have better access to specific areas where
the components are located as well as removing the
inspection criteria of those components. This results in a
reduction in the time required to complete the inspection
portion of the process and directly contributes to reducing
the overall TAT of the aircraft. Any components identified
for replacement are subsequently replaced with new or
reworked components that' have been pre-positioned in the
hangar before the aircraft arrived at the maintenance
facility.
The foreman is immediately notified about any area
discovered to have a deficiency. The foreman, in turn,
identifies the appropriate artisan for the repair action as
soon as repair criteria has been determined. There are no
specific requirements to wait for the inspection process to
be completed. Once the inspectors have finished their
assigned area and have identified the discrepancies, the
artisan begins working on the repair. It is this concept of
concurrent maintenance that is instrumental in reducing the
overall TAT of the overhaul process. In addition, during
this process, all modifications that were identified prior
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to the aircraft's arrival to the hangar are incorporated as
•well as any Structural or other defects found during the
inspection process.
Once the Disassembly, Inspection and Repair Phase is
completed, the Assembly Phase begins. During this time, the
aircraft is reassembled with the remaining pre-positioned
parts and components. Any critical flight components that
require installation are installed and verified for proper
installation. A final verification check of the entire
aircraft is conducted to ensure the overall integrity of the
aircraft as well as to ensure flight worthiness. Following
this, the aircraft is removed from the hangar to a testing
area for the Systems Check Phase. Once the full systems
check is completed, the aircraft is flown on a test flight
where all flight characteristics of the aircraft are
verified. Upon successful completion of the test flight,
the aircraft is then returned to the airport terminal and
put back into operational service.
As previously noted, United Airlines 737 .aircraft are
not painted during the overhaul process and instead, are
independently scheduled to be painted by an outside
contractor. This decision was based on a cost-benefit
analysis where it was determined to be more economical to
have the aircraft painted by an outside contractor separate
53
from the overhaul process. This independent painting
schedule is incorporated into the long-term maintenance
schedule of the aircraft to avoid potential scheduling
conflicts and to minimize the non-operational time of the
aircraft. United Airlines maintenance planners and
schedulers regularly verify this schedule. The outside
painting contractor is held to the same rigid schedule as
the maintenance managers at United Airlines.
2. Management Philosophies and Practices
a) Planning
Aircraft are scheduled on a rigid 48-month cycle
in order to minimize the variability of the overhaul process
and to maintain the expected 25-day TAT of the aircraft.
The purpose of this rigid schedule is two-fold. First, it
is adhered to as a result of safety and maintenance
requirements as recommended by the manufacturer and required
by the Federal Aviation Administration. Secondly, it
affords maintenance schedulers and planners the opportunity
to accurately forecast future aircraft inductions and
associated requirements due to the low variability of the
overhaul process.
The planning process at United Airlines is a
complete package that incorporates not only long range
planning aspects, but also logistical elements such as
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supply support, routing of aircraft and scheduling of
maintenance facilities. The system, called DOT VISIT LIGHT,
is a UNIX based, long range planning tool that affords both
the schedulers and planners the ability to coordinate
efforts to plan and schedule aircraft overhauls two years in
advance. This system incorporates various aspects of
logistics including the obvious elements of supply support,
maintenance facility planning, and transportation. Aircraft
are identified by serial number and a standardized repair
package is prepared. This package includes inspection and
evaluation criteria of known problem areas previously
discovered in other 737 aircraft as well as any inspection
criteria mandated by the FAA or the aircraft manufacturer.
This planning tool provides the foundation of United
Airlines' ability to minimize the TAT of the 737 overhaul
process through early identification of the amount of all
required replacement components before the aircraft arrives
for induction. Additionally, all information within this
system is available to any user who is authorized access to
the system. The decision by United Airlines to have open
access to all information in DOT VISIT LIGHT has resulted in
more efficient coordination between the three groups making
overall decisions: 1) the maintenance planners, 2) the
aircraft operations schedulers and 3) the supply schedulers
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that coordinate the ordering, tracking and delivery of the
necessary parts to support the overhaul effort.
b) Buy versus Route versus Store
United Airlines has a unique maintenance
philosophy regarding the buy versus route versus store
concept. Due to the fact that United Airlines is a
commercial airline, their revenue generating capability is
based on their ability to return an aircraft to a flying
status as soon as possible. Consequently, because of their
ability to effectively plan their maintenance effort, the
maintenance managers of United Airlines have determined,
through cost-benefit analysis, that it is more economical to
replace removed components by the most time efficient means
available. Acquiring replacement components is usually
accomplished through United Airlines' component repair
program. Aircraft components that are removed during the
overhaul process are routed through their respective
component repair shop for complete overhaul and are
subsequently placed back into the United Airlines supply
support system until they are needed in support of another
aircraft overhaul or in support of flight operations. If
there are no replacement components available within United
Airlines' supply system, company schedulers pursue other
options such as a direct buy from outside local vendors or
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procurement from the aircraft manufacturer or even from
competitors. Although this avenue usually results in a
premium price being paid for the component, the philosophy
of maintaining or even reducing the TAT of the overhaul
process remains paramount as an aircraft not flying is an
aircraft not generating revenue.
c) Culture
The culture within United Airlines involves
revenue generation. As "employee/owners" of United
Airlines, every employee from the most junior apprentice to
the most senior maintenance manager is groomed to understand
and realize that in order to keep the company profitable,
each of them must provide United Airlines with their best
effort to return aircraft to a fully safe flying status as
quickly as possible. This mindset is achieved through the
use of DOT VISIT LIGHT. This open system of scheduling and
planning is similar to the F/A-18 PDMSS in that it provides
total access and exchange of information without
restriction. As in the F/A-18 program, this free access of
information allows for early identification of potential
problems or conflicts by the various groups supporting the
overhaul effort. The result is a TAT that is significantly
lower than could be expected if there were no sharing of
information. The decrease in TAT results in lower
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maintenance costs, higher aircraft availability, and
consequently, higher revenues since United Airlines can
provide more revenue-generating flights to the consumer.
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IV. RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides labor hours and cost data for the
F-14 SDLM process from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year
1997. During this period, the F-14 process was sited at
NADEP Norfolk, Virginia, until September 1994 when it began
shifting the F-14 SDLM workload to NADEP Jacksonville,
Florida. This relocation was a result of the Base
Realignment and Closure Committee's decision to close NADEP
Norfolk, Virginia, by September 1995.
The F/A-18 overhaul process was initially dual-sited at
NADEPs North Island, California, and Jacksonville, Florida,
until the end of fiscal year 1991 when the overhaul contract
was awarded to Air Force depots. The overhaul contract was
re-awarded to NADEP North Island, California, beginning in
fiscal year 1993 where it remains today. The labor hour and
cost data for the F/A-18 overhaul process includes data from
fiscal year 1993 through 1997. All F-14 and F/A-18 data as
shown in Appendix C, was obtained from the Commander, Naval
Aviation Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM) Code 6.3.1
located at Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland.
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United Airlines 737 data is based on 12 aircraft that
completed their second overhaul (Heavy Maintenance Visit
check) during calendar year 1997. This data was obtained
from the United Airlines Maintenance Planning and Scheduling
Team located in San Francisco, California.
All financial values presented in this chapter are in
"then year" dollars. The "Linear (Actual)" trend lines
depicted in Figures 1 through 12 represent the average value
of actual labor hours or costs per the number of aircraft
completing the overhaul process.
B. F-14 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
As of the completion of this thesis, only four F-14
aircraft completing overhaul at NADEP Jacksonville, Florida,
had valid data for consideration, review and analysis.
However, research of the F-14 SDLM process indicates that
the management philosophies and practices as well as the
SDLM process itself has not changed from one site to
another. Consequently, data from NADEP Norfolk, Virginia,
and NADEP Jacksonville, Florida, have been used in the
analysis. A total of 76 aircraft were analyzed for labor
hours expended, material costs and overall total costs.
Variations of the process at both locations can be seen
graphically in figures 1 through 6.
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1. Labor Hour Analysis
Figure 1 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Labor
Hours for 76 aircraft that completed SDLM at NADEPs Norfolk,
Virginia, and Jacksonville, Florida, from fiscal year 1990
through fiscal year 1997. The average difference between
actual labor hours and the estimated amount of labor hours
is 10,002 hours. The graph in Figure 1 displays the extreme
variability of expended labor hours per aircraft completing
the SDLM process. Figure 1 also shows an increasing trend
in the amount of labor hours consumed per aircraft while the
estimated number of labor hours remains almost constant.
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Figure 1. NADEPs Norfolk and Jacksonville Estimated vs
Actual Labor Hours
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Figure 2 provides Estimated versus Actual Labor Hours
for the four F-14 aircraft completing the SDLM process at
NADEP Jacksonville, Florida. Although specific analysis and
conclusions can not be made from only four data points, the
indication of continuing high deviation is apparent as the
average difference between the actual amount of labor hours
and the estimated amount is 2,736 more hours. The graph
also displays a significant amount of variability in labor
hours expended as it ranges from 33,036 labor hours to
22,637 labor hours.
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Figure 2. NADEP Jacksonville Estimated vs Actual Labor Hours
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2. Material Cost Analysis
Figure 3 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Material
Costs for 7 6 aircraft that completed SDLM at NADEPs Norfolk,
Virginia, and Jacksonville, Florida from fiscal year 1990
through fiscal year 1997. The average deviation of actual
material costs is $331,178 more than the estimated amount of
material costs. The graph in -Figure 3 displays the extreme
variability of material costs per aircraft completing the
SDLM process. Figure 3 also shows an increasing trend in
the material cost per aircraft while the estimated material
cost remains almost constant.


























Figure 3. NADEPs Norfolk and Jacksonville Estimated vs
Actual Material Costs
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Figure 4 provides Estimated versus Actual Material
Costs for the four F-14 aircraft completing the SDLM process
at NADEP Jacksonville, Florida. Although specific analysis
and conclusions cannot be made from these four data points,
the indication of continuing high variance is again apparent
as the average deviation for the actual material costs is
$277,250 more than the estimated amount. The graph also
displays a significant amount of variability in material
costs as it ranges from $1,391,000 to $487,000.









Estimated Actual Linear (Actual)
Figure 4. NADEP Jacksonville Estimated vs. Actual
Material Costs
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3. Total Cost Analysis
Figure 5 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Total
Costs for 76 aircraft that completed SDLM at NADEPs Norfolk,
Virginia, and Jacksonville, Florida from fiscal year 1990
through fiscal year 1997. The average deviation of total
costs is $905,263 more than estimated. Figure 5 also shows
an increasing trend in the total cost per aircraft while the
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Figure 5. F-14 Estimated vs. Actual Total Costs
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Figure 6 provides Estimated versus Actual Total Costs
for the four F-14 aircraft completing the SDLM process at
NADEP Jacksonville, Florida. Although specific analysis and
conclusions cannot be made from only four data points, the
indication of continuing high variance is apparent as the
average amount of deviation for total cost is $977,750 more
than estimated. The graph "also displays a significant
amount of variability in total costs as it ranges from
$3,947,000 to $2,953,000.








-—Estimated Actual Linear (Actual)
Figure 6. NADEP Jacksonville Estimated vs. Actual
Total Costs
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C. F/A-18 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The F/A-18 overhaul process was initially conducted at
both NADEP North Island, California, and NADEP Jacksonville,
Florida, prior to 1992. However, that overhaul contract was
to expire at the end of 1991 and only a one year contract
was to be awarded for fiscal year 1992. Due to the high
process variability and resulting high costs incurred at
both NADEPs, the contract was awarded to an Air Force Depot.
As a result, NADEP North Island, California, began its
initial planning to regain the contract and return the
process of overhauling naval aircraft to a Navy depot.
As a result of their planning and changes in their
process management philosophy, NADEP North Island,
California, reacquired the F/A-18 overhaul contract
beginning in fiscal year 1993. Their philosophy of
continuous process improvement is clearly shown in the
accompanying data of this section.
1. Labor Hour Analysis
Figure 7 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Labor
Hours for 184 aircraft that completed overhaul at NADEP
North Island, California, from fiscal year 1993 through
fiscal year 1997. Over this 5 year time period, the average
actual labor hours are 539 hours less than the estimated
amount. The graph in Figure 7 clearly displays the
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decreasing variability of expended labor hours per aircraft
over time. Figure 7 also shows a decreasing trend in the
amount of actual labor hours consumed per aircraft as well
as a slightly decreasing trend in the estimated number of
labor hours per aircraft.
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Figure 7. F/A-18 Estimated vs. Actual Labor Hours
2. Material Analysis
Figure 8 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Material
Costs for 184 aircraft that completed overhaul at NADEP
North Island, California, from fiscal year 1993 through
fiscal year 1997. The average actual material costs are
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$12,575 less than the estimated material costs and for the
last 150 aircraft completing overhaul, the average actual
costs are less than the estimated costs. Figure 8 also
shows a decreasing trend in total material costs per
aircraft while the estimated material costs remain
relatively constant.
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Figure 8. F/A-18 Estimated vs. Actual Material Costs
3. Total Cost Analysis
Figure 9 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Total
Costs for 184 aircraft that completed the overhaul process
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at NADEP North Island, California, from fiscal year 1993
through fiscal year 1997. The average total cost per
aircraft is $36,610 less than the estimated total cost per
aircraft and for the last 130 aircraft completing overhaul,
the average total costs are less than the estimated costs.
The graph in Figure 9 clearly displays the decreasing
variability of total costs per aircraft completing the
overhaul process. Figure 9 also shows a significantly
decreasing trend in the total costs per aircraft while the
estimated total costs remains relatively constant.
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Figure 9. F/A-18 Estimated vs. Actual Total Costs
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D. UNITED AIRLINES QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The sample of 12 United Airlines 737 aircraft
completing their second Heavy Maintenance Visit (HMV) checks
during calendar year 1997 was the only data available to the
researchers for consideration, review and analysis by the
completion of this thesis. However, these data are a good
indication of the efficiencies and effectiveness of United
Airlines' overhaul process and shows why their maintenance
program has continuously been recognized as a benchmark
within the airline industry.
1 . Labor Hour Analysis
Figure 10 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Labor
Hours for 12 Boeing 737 aircraft that completed United
Airlines' overhaul process during calendar year 1997. The
average variation of the actual labor hours is 1,906 hours
less than the estimated total labor hours per aircraft. The
graph in Figure 10 clearly displays the decreasing
variability over time of amount of labor hours expended per
aircraft completing an HMV check. Figure 10 also shows the
average actual costs are less than the estimated costs as
well as a decreasing trend in the actual labor hours
consumed per aircraft.
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United 737 Estimated vs. Actual Manhours
-•
— Estimated Actual Linear (Actual)
Figure 10. United 737 Estimated vs. Actual Labor Hours
2. Material Analysis
Figure 11 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Material
Costs for 12 Boeing 737 aircraft that completed United
Airlines' overhaul process during calendar year 1997. The
average material cost per aircraft is $2,119 more than the
estimated material cost per aircraft. The graph in Figure
11 clearly displays the extremely low variability of the
material costs per aircraft completing an HMV check. Figure
11 also shows a fairly constant trend in the material costs
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per aircraft indicating that the overall process of material
usage is under control.
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Figure 11. United 737 Estimated vs. Actual Material Costs
3. Total Cost Analysis
Figure 12 exhibits the Estimated versus Actual Total
Costs for 12 Boeing 737 aircraft that completed United
Airlines' HMV check process during calendar year 1997. The
average total cost per aircraft is $117,529 less than the
estimated total cost per aircraft. Figure 11 also shows a
significantly decreasing trend in the total costs per
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aircraft while the estimated total costs remains constant
over time.

















Estimated •Actual Linear (Actual)
Figure 12. United 737 Estimated vs. Actual Total Costs
E. SUMMARY
Table 1 summarizes the findings exhibited in Figures 1
through 12. A negative number indicates that the average
actual labor hours and/or costs are less than the estimated
labor hours and/or costs.
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Labor Hours Material Costs Total Costs
F-14 (Norfolk &
Jacksonville) 10, 002 $331, 178 $905,263
F-14
Jacksonville 2,735 $277,250 $977,750
F/A-18 -539 $-12,575 $-36, 610
United 737 -1,906 $2, 119 $-117,529
Table 1: Average Difference Between Actual and Estimated
Labor Hours and Costs
As previously discussed in Chapter III, the management
philosophy and practices, the decisions on buying versus
routing versus storing, and the culture within an
organization directly contribute to the overall control of
the process and ultimately, the amount of variation within
the process. Inefficiencies within the NADEP Jacksonville,
Florida, process have resulted in large variations of labor
hours consumed, as well as both material cost and total cost
overruns. Efficiencies found in the F/A-18 and United 737
processes have resulted in smaller variations of labor hours
consumed, as well as smaller material cost and total cost
variations. In fact, these efficiencies have resulted in
both NADEP North Island, California, and United Airlines
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overestimating on average, the amount of labor hours and
total costs expected per aircraft.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined the efficiency and
effectiveness of the F-14, F/A-18 and United Airlines 737
aircraft. The analysis focused on the management
philosophies and practices of 1) planning, 2) the concept of
buy versus route versus store and 3) the culture within each
overhaul process. The analysis also focused on the
resulting variabilities of labor hours consumed, material
costs and total costs based on the respective management
philosophies and practices. The following six conclusions
can be drawn.
1. Current planning for the F-14 SDLM is inefficient
due to disruptions and lack of rigorous advance planning.
Planning for the overhaul and upgrade of a tactical fighter
must be completed weeks prior to the aircraft's arrival.
This allows for sufficient time to identify and acquire
parts, materials, tooling, and modification kits. It also
allows for the timely staffing and identification of the
personnel levels needed to complete the process as
scheduled. Post-induction requests for changes and/or
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additional modifications to the aircraft increase TAT which
result in additional costs to the customer and is a practice
that should be curtailed.
2 . Changing the current policy of Buy versus Route
versus Store can enhance productivity. F-14 aircraft
inducted into the SDLM process must be given the first
priority after deploying squadrons for component
procurement. The coordinated focus of the supply effort
must be to ensure there are no production delays due to the
lack of parts. NAVICP has not worked closely with NADEP
Jacksonville, Florida, to identify and procure those
components whose historical data indicate replacement during
the SDLM process. The resulting parts shortages have forced
NADEP to route components to backshops for repair. This
contributes to the '"Component Death Spiral" where
utilization of supply support decreases and future
surcharges imposed by NAVICP increase. As both a cost and
SDLM TAT reduction initiative, backshop production Should
primarily support restocking the Navy supply system and not
totally supporting the SDLM production line.
3. Improved Total Asset Visibility of inducted
components can reduce F-14 SDLM TAT. Workload priorities
among the component repair shops are not aligned to the
priorities of the SDLM production line. SDLM aircraft
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components inducted for mandatory Fatigue Life Expenditure
(FLE) inspection criteria are not identified to backshop
supervisors as requirements to the SDLM schedule. Backshop
supervisors are primarily focused on completing a
predetermined quarterly quota, which is not harmonized with
supporting the SDLM production line.
4 . TAT of components routed for repair is excessive
and can be improved. With the exception of FLE components,
backshops should support replenishing the supply inventory
and not the production line. As stated in the second
conclusion, F-14 SDLM production priority means that every
part resource must be focused on high velocity SDLM TAT.
Approximately sixty-five percent of backshop components are
not delivered on time to the SDLM production line. Routed
components often get overhauled when a complete overhaul of
the item is neither necessary nor warranted.
5 . Amending current management of the labor force
could result in improved production. The frequent practice
of approving leave of personnel and then approving overtime
upon their return is disruptive and costly to the overhaul
process. This results in the inability to execute workload
efficiently, on schedule and within cost.
6. Overlapping of work phases within the SDLM process
could result in shorter TAT. Concurrent task initiation
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within the process is used effectively by both the F/A-18
and United Airlines 737 overhaul programs. Overlapping of
work phases when possible within a process results in a
shorter overall TAT.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
This section discusses the recommendations concluded
from the research effort.
1. Identify Pre-induction requirements. Customers
should identify specific aircraft for induction and request
all modifications to that aircraft prior to its induction
into the SDLM process. Except for safety of flight issues",
it is imperative that no further changes or additional
modifications be accepted once the aircraft is inducted.
2. Eliminate parts shortages and initiate dialogue with
NAVICP to facilitate better communication. NAVICP should
make an initial investment and establish an economical order
size for all needed F-14 components currently at "zero
depth" in the Navy supply system. This eliminates NADEP
attempting to gain control of a component shortage problem
through "cost-intensive" in-house backshop support. In
addition, identify one coordinating manager from NADEP
Jacksonville, Florida, and one from NAVICP who understand
SDLM requirements and can forecast and budget total
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requirements to match NADEP capacity. This will result in a
more cooperative effort between the two commands-.
3. Establish better coordination between NADEP
divisions. SDLM production line management must develop the
communication networks necessary to ensure that the focus of
backshop support is toward the SDLM production process
regarding FLE components and not toward divisional quotas.
4. Control out of scope tasks. Components requiring
repair beyond the normal range of SDLM specifications need
to be identified for additional funding. Furthermore,
components removed from the SDLM aircraft and routed to
backshops for inspections/repair should be replaced by
inventory assets. Backshops should only overhaul components
if necessary and return them to the supply inventory.
5. Reduce dependency on overtime. Issue guidelines to
supervisors for efficient use and authorization of annual
leave to minimize the amount of overtime needed to maintain
the established production schedule. Annual leave must be
planned in advance in order to execute the workload
efficiently and on schedule.
6. Implement simultaneous execution of specific work
phases. SDLM process managers need to identify potential
work phases that can be performed simultaneously within
labor, material and logistical constraints.
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In the course of this research, many ideas surfaced
which could provide areas for further research. One idea
specifically tied to this thesis is the utilization of NADEP
backshop support to solely provide for the Navy supply
system and not the SDLM production line. Four other ideas
include
:
1. In response to a lack of initial production
aircraft in the foreseeable future, investigate
the potential cost benefit of increasing the
financial backing to the current overhaul program
as if it were an initial production program.
2. Compare a budget/time phased overhaul plan to the
present depot process to determine potential cost
savings related to reductions of process
variability.
3. Identify facility-related chokepoints and
potential solutions as they apply to Naval
Aviation Depots.
4. Determine the cost-benefit opportunity for
partnering with industry versus expanding the
current NADEP core capabilities.
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F-14B 161873 Nov-97 4 Nov-97 ASPA fail(#4) Oct-05
F-14B 163218 Dec-97 4 Dec-97 ASPA fail(#4) Aug-06
F-14A 160902 Sep-99 1 Dec-97 112% [3G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161620 May-99 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161624 Feb-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159848 May-98 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159873 Nov-00 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160386 May-99 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160396 Mar-00 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160909 Mar-98 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161270 Mar-98 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159465 Mar-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160896 Nov-98 5 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160908 Sep-97 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161162 Sep-00 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161164 Jun-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161616 Feb-98 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161850 Jan-98 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161853 Dec-97 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Aug-00
F-14A 161864 Mar-98 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161868 Jun-98 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159845 Apr-00 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159864 Oct-99 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160403 May-98 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160669 Apr-00 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160696 Jul-98 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160914 Dec-98 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160917 Aug-98 5 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160925 Aug-00 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160928 Apr-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161141 May-00 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161271 Jun-98 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161285 Sep-98 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97















F-14A 162598 Jan-99 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Feb-01
F-14A 162607 Jun-98 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 162689 Dec-99 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161857 May-98 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14B 161608 Dec-97 4 Dec-97 Upgrd (SDLM) Jan-07
F-14A 162604 Apr-98 2 Jan-98 5K Skd [5G rest] Nov-01
F-14D 159595 May-99 1 Jan-98 5K [790] Sked Nov-06
F-14D 163898 Nov-97 3 Jan-98 SDLM+5/7k Oct-08
F-14A 160391 Nov-98 1 Jan-98 82% TCR Jan-98
F-14A 160910 Jul-01 1 Jan-98 112%DDead Jan-98
F-14A 161626 May-98 2 Feb-98 5K Sked Oct-01
F-14A 162600 Oct-98 2 Feb-98 82% TCR May-02
F-14B 162927 Feb-98 4 Feb-98 Upgrd (SDLM) Nov-04
F-14B 162925 Apr-98 4 Mar-98 Upgrd (SDLM) Jun-10
F-14D 163413 Apr-98 4 Mar-98 SDLM+5/7k Nov-10
F-14A 160920 May-98 4 Mar-98 82% TCR Mar-98
F-14A 162603 Feb-98 1 Apr-98 5K Skd [5G rest] Dec-00
F-14A 162688 Oct-99 1 Apr-98 5K Sked Dec-02
F-14A 162696 Jan-99 1 Apr-98 5K Skd [5G rest] Feb-02
F-14B 161422 Apr-98 4 Apr-98 Upgrd (SDLM) Oct-04
F-14D 163896 Mar-98 3 Apr-98 SDLM+5/7k Dec-08
F-14B 161440 Sep-98 5 Apr-98 100% TCR Apr-98
F-14A 158636 Apr-98 4 Apr-98 ASPA fail(#4) Mar-07
F-14A 159855 Apr-98 7 Apr-98 ASPA fail(#4) Apr-98
F-14D 159600 Nov-98 1 May-98 5K [790] Sked Oct-06
F-14D 161163 Aug-98 3 May-98 SDLM+9kV-V Oct-01
F-14B 163215 Jun-98 5 Jun-98 Upgrd (SDLM) Apr-07
F-14B 163224 Aug-98 5 Jun-98 Upgrd (SDLM) Aug-09
F-14D 159610 Mar-98 2 Jun-98 SDLM+7k Feb-03
F-14D 161166 Aug-98 1 Jun-98 5K [790] Sked Jan-07
F-14A 158617 Sep-97 2 Jul-98 5K Sked Feb-03
F-14A 161603 Sep-98 2 Jul-98 5K Sked Nov-00
F-14A 161607 Dec-97 1 Jul-98 5K Skd [5G rest] Oct-01
F-14A 161619 Jul-98 1 Jul-98 5K Sked Jun-02
F-14A 162704 Jun-99 1 Jul-98 5K Skd [5G rest] May-01
F-14B 162918 Apr-98 5 Jul-98 Upgrd (SDLM) Jun-02















F-14D 159613 Apr-97 1 Jul-98 SDLM+7k Apr-04
F-14A 161276 May-98 3 Jul-98 82% TCR Nov-02
F-14B 162926 Jul-98 5 Aug-98 Upgrd (SDLM) May-10
F-14D 163894 Aug-97 3 Aug-98 ASPA fail (#4) Jan-09
F-14D 163897 Aug-97 3 Aug-98 ASPA fail(#4) May-09
F-14A 158637 Sep-00 1
.
Aug-98 82% TCR Mar-02
F-14A 158615 Aug-98 3 Aug-98 82% TCR Aug-98
F-14A 158629 Apr-00 1 Aug-98 82% TCR Mar-02
F-14A 161291 Jul-98 5 Sep-98 SDLM+5k,T Sep-03
F-14B 161417 Sep-98 5 Sep-98 ASPA fail(#5) Sep-98
F-14B 163407 Aug-98 5 Sep-98 Upgrd (SDLM) Aug-08
F-14D 159603 May-99 1 Sep-98 5K [790] Sked Jun-06
F-14D 163893 Sep-98 4 Sep-98 ASPA fail(#4) Sep-09
F-14A 161600 Mar-98 3 Sep-98 82% [5G Rest] Sep-01
F-14B 161860 Nov-98 2 Oct-98 Ug (SDLM+9k) Mar-05
F-14B 163410 Sep-98 4 Oct-98 Ug (SDLM+9k) Jun-05
F-14A 161866 Oct-97 3 Oct-98 ASPA fail(#4) Jul-04
F-14A 161622 Jun-98 2 Oct-98 82% TCR Oct-02
F-14A 158633 Jul-98 3 Oct-98 82% TCR Jun-02
F-14B 161858 Oct-97 1 Nov-98 Upgrd (7k ??) Oct-06
F-14A 160681 May-98 3 Nov-98 82% TCR Nov-98
F-14D 163895 Nov-98 4 Nov-98 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-08
F-14B 163226 Nov-97 3 Nov-98 ASPA fail(#4) Nov-05
F-14D 163900 Nov-98 4 Nov-98 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-08
F-14A 162592 Jul-98 1 Dec-98 5K Sked Apr-02
F-14B 162705 Dec-98 2 Dec-98 Ug (SDLM+9k) Nov-04
F-14A 158614 Sep-97 Dec-98 82% TCR Oct-02
F-14A 162594 Nov-98 Jan-99 5K Skd [5G rest] Nov-01
F-14A 162597 May-98 Jan-99 5K Skd [5G rest] Apr-01
F-14A 162606 Oct-98 Jan-99 5K Sked Sep-02
F-14B 162693 Jan-99 Jan-99 Ug (9k+SDLM ??) Feb-01
F-14B 161429 Jan-98 4 Jan-99 ASPA fail(#5) Jan-99
F-14A 160382 Jan-98 Jan-99 82% TCR Jan-99
F-14A 158618 Dec-00 Jan-99 82% TCR Dec-02
F-14A 161168 Nov-98 Feb-99 5K Sked Jun-03
F-14A 161856 Apr-01 Feb-99 5K Sked Nov-02















F-14A 158612 Jun-98 3 Feb-99 82% TCR Dec-02
F-14B 161851 Jun-98 3 Feb-99 112%DDead Apr-97
F-14B 162703 Jul-00 1 Mar-99 Upgrd (7k ??) Jan-04
F-14B 163229 Sep-98 4 Mar-99 Ug (SDLM+9k) Jun-05
F-14D 159618 Jan-00 1 Mar-99 5K [790] Sked Oct-05
F-14B 161419 Mar-98 4 Mar-99 ASPA fail(#5) Mar-99
F-14B 162913 Mar-98 4 Mar-99 ASPA fail(#5) Mar-06
F-14A 160666 Aug-97 3 Mar-99 82% TCR Mar-99
F-14A 158627 Mar-98 3 Mar-99 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-07
F-14D 163902 Mar-98 3 Mar-99 ASPA fail(#4) Apr-08
F-14A 158632 Apr-98 3 Apr-99 ASPA fail(#4) Apr-08
F-14B 161437 Apr-98 3 Apr-99 100% TCR Apr-99
F-14A 158620 Apr-98 3 Apr-99 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-05
F-14B 161434 Apr-98 4 Apr-99 ASPA fail(#5) Apr-99
F-14D 163903 Apr-98 3 Apr-99 ASPA fail(#4) Nov-09
F-14D 161159 Oct-98 3 Apr-99 ASPA fail(#3) May-05
F-14B 161599 Jan-98 3 Apr-99 112%DDead Apr-99
F-14A 161617 Mar-99 1 May-99 5K Sked Sep-03
F-14B 162699 Jul-99 1 May-99 Ug (9k+SDLM ??) Jan-02
F-14A 160678 May-98 5 May-99 ASPA fail(#6) May-99
F-14B 163216 Mar-98 3 Jun-99 Ug (SDLM+9k) Apr-05
F-14D 163416 Jun-98 3 Jun-99 ASPA fail(#4) Dec-09
F-14D 164343 Jun-98 3 Jun-99 ASPA fail(#4) Aug-07
F-14D 164344 Jun-98 3 Jun-99 ASPA fail(#4) Apr-09
F-14D 164342 Jun-98 3 Jun-99 ASPA fail(#4) Nov-06
F-14D 163904 Jun-98 3 Jun-99 ASPA fail(#4) Jul-08
F-14A 161274 Apr-00 1 Jul-99 5K Sked Jan-03
F-14B 162695 Aug-00 1 Jul-99 Upgrd (7k ??) Apr-04
F-14B 161871 Jul-98 3 Jul-99 ASPA fail(#4) Jul-06
F-14D 164341 Jul-98 3 Jul-99 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-08
F-14A 159591 Jun-01 1 Aug-99 82% TCR Sep-03
F-14A 158635 Aug-97 2 Aug-99 ASPA fail(#4) Nov-07
F-14D 163412 Aug-98 3 Aug-99 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-12
F-14D 164345 Aug-98 3 Aug-99 ASPA fail(#4) Feb-09
F-14D 159628 Jan-99 1 Aug-99 82% TCR Feb-06
F-14B 161859 Aug-98 2 Sep-99 Ug (9k+SDLM ??) Jul-03















F-14D 164348 Sep-98 3 Sep-99 ASPA fail(#4) Mar-08
F-14A 161281 Mar-98 2 Sep-99 112%DDead Sep-99
F-14D 164347 Sep-98 3 Sep-99 ASPA fail(#4) Oct-08
F-14D 164350 Oct-98 3 Oct-99 ASPA fail(#4) Apr-10
F-14D 164346 Nov-98 3 Nov-99 ASPA fail(#4) Oct-08
F-14A 160891 Sep-97 3 Nov-99 112%DDead Nov-99
F-14A 160913 Apr-98 4 Nov-99 82% TCR Nov-99
F-14D 164351 Dec-98 3 Dec-99 ASPA fail(#4) Sep-10
F-14D 164600 Dec-97 2 Dec-99 ASPA fail(#4) Mar-08
F-14B 163220 Jan-99 4 Jan-00 ASPA fail(#5) Sep-08
F-14B 163222 Jan-99 4 Jan-00 ASPA fail(#5) Mar-07
F-14D 163415 Jan-98 2 Jan-00 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-09
F-14D 164349 Jan-98 2 Jan-00 ASPA fail(#4) Mar-10
F-14D 164602 Jan-98 2 Jan-00 ASPA fail(#4) Aug-10
F-14D 164599 Feb-98 2 Feb-00 ASPA fail(#4) Aug-1
1
F-14D 159592 Aug-98 1 Feb-00 100% TCR Apr-04
F-14D 164603 Feb-99 3 Feb-00 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-11
F-14A 162611 Jan-99 1 Feb-00 82% TCR Apr-04
F-14A 162591 Dec-98 2 Feb-00 112%DDead Feb-00
F-14B 163408 Mar-98 3 Mar-00 ASPA fail(#5) Feb-10
F-14D 159619 May-97 1 Mar-00 ASPA fail(#3) Dec-03
F-14D 159629 Mar-98 1 Mar-00 ASPA fail(#3) Feb-04
F-14D 164601 Mar-98 2 Mar-00 ASPA fail(#4) Apr-09
F-14D 164604 Mar-98 2 Mar-00 ASPA fail(#4) Sep-11
F-14B 162915 May-98 4 May-00 ASPA fail(#6) Feb-07
F-14A 162697 Feb-01 1 Jun-00 112%DDead Jun-00
F-14B 163409 Sep-98 3 Sep-00 ASPA fail(#5) Apr-07
F-14B 163223 Sep-98 4 Sep-00 ASPA fail(#6) Jan-10
F-14A 162601 Apr-99 1 Oct-00 82% TCR Nov-04
F-14A 162698 Dec-98 1 Oct-00 82% TCR Dec-04
F-14A 160378 Nov-97 3 Nov-00 ASPA fail(#6) Nov-00
F-14A 162589 Nov-97 2 Nov-00 112%DDead Feb-99
F-14A 161160 Jul-99 1 Nov-00 112%DDead Nov-00
F-14D 163417 Dec-97 1 Dec-00 ASPA fail(#4) Feb-11
F-14A 160667 Feb-98 3 Dec-00 82% TCR Dec-00
F-14B 161428 Dec-00 1 Jan-01 100% TCR Aug-05















F-14A 161621 Jan-98 Jan-01 82% TCR Mar-05
F-14A 162608 Jul-99 Feb-01 82% TCR Mar-05
F-14D 159630 Jan-98 Feb-01 ASPA fail(#3) Aug-05
F-14B 163227 Feb-99 3 Feb-01 ASPA fail(#5) Oct-06
F-14B 163228 Feb-98 3 Feb-01 ASPA fail(#6) Sep-06
F-14B 161862 Jul-98 Apr-01 100% TCR Feb-05
F-14B 162700 Oct-98 Oct-01 ASPA fail(#4) Jun-07
F-14A 162610 Jul-00 Oct-01 82% TCR Nov-05
F-14B 162692 Dec-98 Dec-01 ASPAfail(#4) May-07
F-14A 159428 Jun-99 Dec-01 82% TCR Feb-06
F-14B 161441 May-02 Feb-02 105% TCR Dec-04
F-14B 162691 Mar-99 Mar-02 ASPA fail(#4) Feb-08
F-14A 161292 Mar-99 2 Mar-02 112%DDead May-99
F-14B 161424 Dec-01 Jun-02 100% TCR Jun-02
F-14B 161435 May-01 Jun-02 105% TCR Apr-06
F-14B 161432 Apr-01 Jun-02 105% TCR Apr-06
F-14A 161280 May-00 Jul-02 112%DDead Aug-99
F-14A 158634 Jul-97 Jul-02 ASPA fail(#5) Oct-08
F-14B 162912 Nov-98 2 Aug-02 105% TCR Jun-06
F-14A 161612 Jan-98 2 Aug-02 ASPA fail(#6) Nov-01
F-14B 162920 Apr-01 Sep-02 100% TCR May-07
F-14B 161442 Sep-99 Sep-02 ASPA fail(#4) Jan-08
F-14A 161272 Jan-01 Sep-02 112%DDead Sep-02
F-14B 162694 Jan-01 Oct-02 105% TCR Aug-05
F-14A 161609 Jul-99 Oct-02 82% TCR Oct-02
F-14A 161284 Aug-98 2 Oct-02 112%DDead Dec-99
F-14B 161421 Apr-01 Dec-02 105% TCR Oct-06
F-14B 161418 Jan-00 3 Mar-03 105% TCR Dec-06
F-14B 162916 Jan-01 May-03 105% TCR Mar-06
F-14A 161869 May-97 Aug-03 82% TCR Sep-07
F-14A 159829 Oct-99 Oct-03 ASPA fail(#5) Oct-03
F-14B 161433 Nov-99 Nov-03 105% TCR Sep-06
F-14A 161288 Jul-98 Nov-03 112%DDead Dec-00
F-14A 161863 Dec-99 Dec-03 ASPA fail(#5) Feb-12
F-14A 161275 Oct-99 2 Jan-04 112%DDead Feb-01
F-14B 162922 Aug-01 Feb-04 100% TCR Feb-04
















F-14B 161870 Jun-00 2 Feb-04 105% TCR Dec-06
F-14B 162911 Sep-01 Mar-04 100% TCR Mar-04
F-14B 161427 May-98 May-04 105% TCR Mar-07
F-14B 162919 May-02 Jun-04 100% TCR Jun-04
F-14A 158628 Jun-99 Jul-04 112%DDead Aug-01
F-14B 161426 Jun-98 2 Aug-04 105% TCR Jun-08
F-14B 162917 Aug-01 Aug-04 105% TCR Jun-08
F-14B 162921 Jan-02 Aug-04 100% TCR Aug-04
F-14B 162701 Dec-00 Mar-05 105% TCR Feb-09
F-14D 163418 Apr-00 3 Apr-05 105% TCR Oct-07
F-14A 160658 Apr-00 Apr-05 ASPA fail (#6) Apr-05
F-14A 161295 Apr-99 2 May-05 112%DDead Jun-02
F-14B 163225 Jul-99 Aug-05 105% TCR Jun-08
F-14B 163221 Nov-01 Nov-05 ASPA fail(#5) Oct-09
F-14B 162923 Feb-02 Feb-06 ASPA fail(#5) Jun-09
F-14B 163217 Jun-00 Feb-06 105% TCR Jan-10
F-14B 162924 Oct-00 Jun-06 105% TCR May-10
F-14B 162910 Nov-01 Aug-06 ASPA fail(#5) Nov-1
1
F-14A 161294 Jan-02 Sep-06 112%DDead Sep-03
F-14A 161293 May-00 3 Oct-06 112%DDead Oct-03
F-14B 163219 Feb-99 1 Oct-06 105% TCR Sep-10
F-14A 158624 Apr-02 4 Nov-06 112%DDead Dec-03
F-14D 163901 Sep-98 2 Jan-07 ASPA fail(#5) Jul-10
F-14A 161297 Aug-99 2 Jan-07 112%DDead Feb-04
F-14D 163899 Mar-98 1 Apr-07 105% TCR Nov-1
F-14A 158616 Jun-02 1 Jun-07 ASPA fail(#6) Jun-05
F-14A 158630 Jun-98 2 Sep-07 ASPA fail(#6) May-07
F-14A 161299 Oct-99 1 Nov-07 ASPA fail(#6) May-07
F-14A 161296 May-99 2 Mar-08 112%DDead Mar-05
F-14A 158631 Sep-98 1 Aug-08 ASPA fail(#6) Mar-06
F-14A 158625 Aug-97 2 Aug-01 ASPA fail(#6) Aug-01
F-14A 158984 Jul-98 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159455 Jul-97 4 Jul-99 ASPA fail(#6) Jul-99
F-14A 159836 Nov-97 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159868 Oct-97 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 159871 Nov-97 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97















F-14A 160397 Oct-99 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160405 Apr-97 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160406 Jul-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160407 Apr-98 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160408 Feb-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160411 Aug-97 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160655 Nov-97 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160665 Jun-98 4 Dec-98 82% TCR Dec-98
F-14A 160671 Dec-97 3 May-99 82% TCR May-99
F-14A 160673 Jul-97 3 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160686 Sep-97 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160687 May-98 5 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160689 Mar-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160692 Jan-97 2 Jan-98 82% [5G Rest] Jan-98
F-14A 160693 Aug-97 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160893 Mar-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160900 Mar-98 5 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160911 May-97 3 Dec-97 112%DDead Dec-97
F-14A 160915 Aug-99 1 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 160926 Mar-99 1 Dec-97 112% [3G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161133 Sep-97 4 Dec-97 112% [3G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161134 Apr-99 1 Dec-97 112% [3G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161135 Mar-98 4 Dec-97 112% [3G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161139 Nov-98 1 May-97 Strk Rqst, Fire May-97
F-14A 161140 Apr-98 5 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161147 Nov-97 2 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161155 Aug-98 5 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161161 Aug-97 5 Aug-97 ASPA fail(#5) Aug-97
F-14A 161445 Sep-97 3 Sep-97 ASPA fail(#5) Sep-97
F-14A 161611 Feb-98 4 Dec-97 82% [5G Rest] Dec-97
F-14A 161618 Sep-98 1 Jan-98 82% TCR Jan-98
F-14A 161852 Jun-98 3 Jun-99 112%DDead Jun-99
F-14A 162588 Jan-98 2 Dec-97 112%DDead Dec-97
F-14A 162709 May-97 2 May-97 ASPA failed May-97
F-14A 162710 Nov-97 7 Nov-97 ASPA fail(#4) Nov-97
F-14A 162711 Oct-96 4 Oct-96 ASPA failed Oct-96















F-14B 161416 Jun-97 3 Jun-98 Offset/Stow Feb-97
F-14B 161425 Jun-98 4 Feb-98 100%TCR Feb-98
F-14B 161438 Jun-96 1 Jul-00 If rtned to Service Jun-95
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APPENDIX C. F-14 AND F/A-18
FINANCIAL DATA
Manhours Material Costs Total Costs
NADEP TMS RWK BUNO FY Est Act Var Est Act Var Est Act Var
NORVA F14 SDLM 159454 90 18124 29074 -10950 439208 604315 -165107 1277683 1821871 -544188
NORVA F14 SDLM 159606 90 18124 30545 -12421 439208 639533 -200325 1280084 1957956 -677872
NORVA F14 SDLM 161147 90 18124 22413 -4289 439208 325671 113537 1189542 1240985 -51443
NORVA F14 SDLM 159017 90 18124 22437 -4313 439208 258875 180333 1173568 1127904 45664
NORVA F14 SDLM 159457 90 18124 25455 -7331 439208 439952 -744 1173568 1540597 -367029
NORVA F14 SDLM 161150 90 18124 20809 -2685 439208 332760 106448 1173568 1217341 43773
NORVA F14 SDLM 161164 90 18124 21263 -3139 439208 421740 17468 1173568 1247059 -73491
NORVA F14 SDLM 161281 90 18124 23254 -5130 439208 509074 -69866 1173568 1562132 -388564
NORVA F14 SDLM 161850 90 18124 24207 -6083 439208 355653 83555 1173568 1433163 -259595
NORVA F14 SDLM 161853 90 18124 18546 -422 439208 399229 39979 1173568 1229858 -56290
NORVA F14 SDLM 161857 90 18124 23929 -5805 439208 341123 98085 1173568 1398763 -225195
NORVA F14 SDLM 161861 90 18124 26558 -8434 439208 428933 10275 1173568 1636819 -463251
NORVA F14 SDLM 160391 91 18124 29385 -11261 432000 721994 -289994 1305033 2265780 -960747
NORVA F14 SDLM 160403 91 18124 39587 -21463 432000 1087946 -€55946 1305033 2711617 -1406584
NORVA F14 SDLM 161284 91 18124 30363 -12239 432000 826597 -394597 1305033 2204405 -899372
NORVA F14 SDLM 162600 91 18124 31556 -13432 432000 621925 -189925 1305033 2050086 -745053
NORVA F14 SDLM 162604 91 18124 19944 -1820 432000 396677 35323 1305033 1488318 -183285
NORVA F14 SDLM 160386 92 18374 23676 -5302 424582 451404 •26822 1402263 1496306 -94043
NORVA F14 SDLM 160390 92 18374 19472 -1098 424582 381290 43292 1402263 1273552 128711
NORVA F14 SDLM 161134 92 18374 28416 -10042 424582 1299196 -874614 1402263 3114535 -1712272
NORVA F14 SDLM 161139 92 18374 32575 -14201 424582 813168 -388586 1402263 2520780 -1118517
NORVA F14 SDLM 161152 92 18374 36787 -18413 424582 1130224 -705642 1402263 3008961 -1606698
NORVA F14 SDLM 161603 92 18374 33269 -14895 424582 614948 -190366 1402263 2296878 -894615
NORVA F14 SDLM 161615 92 18374 32965 -14591 424582 747968 -323386 1402263 2511418 -1109155
NORVA F14 SDLM 161618 92 18374 28388 -10014 424582 654046 -229464 1402263 2224934 -822671
NORVA F14 SDLM 161621 92 18374 31239 -12865 424582 843760 •419178 1402263 2559593 -1157330
NORVA F14 SDLM 162602 92 18374 30579 -12205 424582 576028 -151446 1402263 2164033 -761770
NORVA F14 SDLM 162692 92 18374 27606 -9232 424582 566071 -141489 1402263 2097545 -695282
NORVA F14 SDLM 160382 92 18374 31750 -13376 424582 550492 -125910 1402263 2282998 -880735
NORVA F14 SDLM 160407 92 18374 32803 -14429 424582 590394 -165812 1402263 2362124 -959861
NORVA F14 SDLM 161285 92 18374 34703 -16329 424582 689093 -264511 1402263 2496859 -1094596
NORVA F14 SDLM 161607 92 18374 25837 -7463 424582 602702 -178120 1402263 2016981 -614718
NORVA F14 SDLM 161609 92 18374 31363 -12989 424582 506284 -81702 1402263 2188913 -786650
NORVA F14 SDLM 162599 92 18374 27644 -9270 424582 434861 -10279 1402263 1947377 -545114
NORVA F14 SDLM 162603 92 18374 24522 -6148 424582 365524 59058 1402263 1693551 -291288
NORVA F14 SDLM 162691 92 18374 27179 -8805 424582 494002 -69420 1402263 1956287 -554024
NORVA F14 SDLM 162693 92 18374 28195 -9821 424582 453443 -28861 1402263 1964531 -562268
NORVA F14 SDLM 162700 92 18374 26702 -8328 424582 411899 12683 1402263 1885117 -482854
NORVA F14 SDLM 158629 93 20004 38362 -18358 449886 1214726 -764840 1551306 3490755 -1939449
NORVA F14 SDLM 158637 93 20004 36586 -16582 449886 1508618 -1058732 1551306 3698255 -2146949
NORVA F14 SDLM 159864 93 20004 29903 -9899 449886 1087242 -637356 1551306 2835075 -1283769
NORVA F14 SDLM 159867 93 20004 35454 -15450 449886 1367451 -917565 1551306 3243713 -1692407
NORVA F14 SDLM 160379 93 20004 30642 -10638 449886 656642 -206756 1551306 2360534 -809228
NORVA F14 SDLM 160915 93 20004 35709 -15705 449886 1484585 -1034699 1551306 3390360 -1839054
NORVA F14 SDLM 160926 93 20004 36388 -16384 449886 975458 -525572 1551306 3029125 -1477819
NORVA F14 SDLM 161160 93 20004 29814 -9810 449886 1590225 -1140339 1551306 3179819 -1628513
NORVA F14 SDLM 161282 93 20004 32344 -12340 449886 1332893 -883007 1551306 3354108 -1802802
NORVA F14 SDLM 161620 93 20004 47542 -27538 449886 1439847 -989961 1551306 4020198 -2468892
NORVA F14 SDLM 162592 93 20004 31540 -11536 449886 828010 -378124 1551306 2534140 -982834
NORVA F14 SDLM 162594 93 20004 28401 -8397 449886 595334 -145448 1551306 2192963 -641657
NORVA F14 SDLM 162597 93 20004 20811 -807 449886 428785 21101 1551306 1550401 905
NORVA F14 SDLM 162598 93 20004 29375 -9371 449886 787851 -337965 1551306 2551645 -1000339
99
Manhours Material Costs Total Costs
NADEP TMS RWK BUNO FY Est Act Var Est Act Var Est Act Var
NORVA F14 SDLM 162601 93 20004 26045 -6041 449886 809730 -359844 1551306 2248723 -697417
NORVA F14 SDLM 162606 93 20004 27599 -7595 449886 756446 -306560 1551306 2305257 -753951
NORVA F14 SDLM 162608 93 20004 30650 -10646 449886 1023799 -573913 1551306 2718699 -1167393
NORVA F14 SDLM 162611 93 20004 26333 -6329 449886 1037182 -587296 1551306 2478812 -927506
NORVA F14 SDLM 162688 93 20004 29811 -9807 449886 1041853 -591967 1551306 3067210 -1515904
NORVA F14 SDLM 162696 93 20004 29513 -9509 449886 765181 -315295 1551306 2410947 -859641
NORVA F14 SDLM 162699 93 20004 26074 -6070 449886 876770 -426884 1551306 2359943 -808637
NORVA F14 SDLM 162704 93 20004 28055 -8051 449886 1331978 -882092 1551306 3063259 -1511953
NORVA F14 SDLM 159845 94 19878 36585 -16707 423699 1159941 -736242 1537861 3444412 -1906551
NORVA F14 SDLM 160669 94 19878 35279 -15401 423699 1161319 -737620 1537861 3353558 -1815697
NORVA F14 SDLM 160925 94 19878 42194 -22316 423699 1091743 -668044 1537861 3636931 -2099070
NORVA F14 SDLM 161141 94 19878 33561 -13683 423699 692752 -269053 1537861 2743268 -1205407
NORVA F14 SDLM 161274 94 19878 36425 -16547 423699 922174 -498475 1537861 3148655 -1610794
NORVA F14 SDLM 162689 94 19878 29597 -9719 423699 1067307 -643608 1537861 2932549 -1394688
NORVA F14 SDLM 160902 94 19878 31900 -12022 423699 1595340 -1171641 1537861 3357346 -1819485
NORVA F14 SDLM 161617 94 19878 35924 -16046 423699 716770 -293071 1537861 2686931 -1149070
JAX F14 SDLM 160910 95 19265 33036 -13771 490000 868000 -378000 2186000 3705000 -1519000
NORVA F14 SDLM 159873 95 19265 37197 -17932 496612 1373645 -877033 2017584 3575082 -1557498
NORVA F14 SDLM 160658 95 19265 32377 -13112 496612 919665 -423053 2017584 3137741 -1120157
NORVA F14 SDLM 161162 95 19265 5403 13862 496612 143234 353378 2017584 565850 1451734
NORVA F14 SDLM 161432 95 19265 18205 1060 496612 7470 489142 2017584 808889 1208695
JAX F14 SDLM 161280 96 28807 32772 -3965 793000 1391000 -598000 2503000 3947000 -1444000
JAX F14 SDLM 161294 96 28807 30919 -2112 793000 487000 306000 2503000 3116000 -613000
JAX F14 SDLM 162589 97 28807 22637 6170 819000 1258000 -439000 2618000 2953000 -335000
100
Manhours Material Costs Total Costs
NADEP TMS RWK BUNO FY Est Act Var Est Act Var Est Act Var
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161353 93 6555 7622 -1067 89400 327261 -237861 499874 1014466 -514592
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161711 93 6555 7772 -1217 89400 206799 -117399 499874 745397 -245523
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161937 93 6555 6799 -244 89400 209462 -120062 499874 587240 -87366
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161939 93 6555 6470 85 89400 139912 -50512 499874 676834 -176960
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162445 93 6555 6414 141 89400 195025 -105625 499874 701538 -201664
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162463 93 6555 6876 -321 89400 341685 -252285 499874 584650 -84776
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162861 93 6555 8486 -1931 89400 222499 -133099 499874 789828 -289954
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162863 93 6555 7883 -1328 89400 331878 -242478 499874 629071 -129197
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162877 93 6555 6785 -230 89400 211201 -121801 499874 609002 -109128
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162889 93 6555 8216 -1661 89400 230987 -141587 499874 796798 -296924
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162890 93 6555 8080 -1525 89400 485531 -396131 499874 771142 -271268
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162892 93 6555 9000 -2445 . 89400 228166 -138766 499874 942290 -442416
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162904 93 6555 9156 -2601 89400 248115 -158715 499874 1019163 -519289
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162905 93 6555 6501 54 89400 225320 -135920 499874 724115 -224241
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163100 93 6555 8883 -2328 89400 216560 -127160 499874 760338 -260464
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163120 93 6555 7406 -851 89400 244896 -155496 499874 739658 -239784
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163142 93 6555 6856 -301 89400 192087 -102687 499874 728177 -228303
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163143 93 6555 8705 -2150 89400 281504 -192104 499874 855941 -356067
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163147 93 6555 7545 -990 89400 219213 -129813 499874 714226 -214352
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163161 93 6555 4202 2353 89400 46127 43273 499874 593121 -93247
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163163 93 6555 6290 265 89400 158789 -69389 499874 564381 -64507
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163173 93 6555 6316 239 89400 172702 -83302 499874 682257 -182383
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163439 93 6555 6802 -247 89400 306418 -217018 499874 573718 -73844
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163452 93 6555 4311 2244 89400 143570 -54170 499874 547606 -47732
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163456 93 6555 6609 -54 89400 271781 -182381 499874 820283 -320409
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163458 93 6555 8483 -1928 89400 176139 -86739 499874 816736 -316862
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163465 93 6555 6668 -113 89400 145571 -56171 499874 622212 -122338
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163478 93 6555 5910 645 89400 86849 2551 499874 594551 -94677
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163481 93 6555 6583 -28 89400 142494 -53094 499874 660458 -160584
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163494 93 6555 7213 -658 89400 110355 -20955 499874 836066 -336192
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163708 93 6555 8256 -1701 89400 125043 -35643 499874 867056 -367182
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163717 93 6555 6364 191 89400 140858 -51458 499874 566765 -66891
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163730 93 6555 5296 1259 89400 84681 4719 499874 622506 -122632
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163733 93 6555 6017 538 89400 100661 -11261 499874 665493 -165619
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163740 93 6555 8019 -1464 89400 194324 -104924 499874 721717 -221843
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163746 93 6555 10978 -4423 89400 301305 -211905 499874 1009625 -509751
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163754 93 6555 7417 -862 89400 131940 -42540 499874 867548 -367674
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163765 93 6555 6900 -345 89400 207826 -118426 499874 744691 -244817
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161955 94 6054 8069 -2015 165200 241081 -75881 604297 812742 -208445
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162436 94 6054 8202 -2148 165200 268336 -103136 604297 894900 -290603
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163124 94 6054 8465 -2411 165200 267355 -102155 604297 828963 -224666
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163131 94 6054 6514 -460 165200 120541 44659 604297 757065 -152768
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163435 94 6054 6726 -672 165200 211125 -45925 604297 692168 -87871
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163449 94 6054 5003 1051 165200 65939 99261 604297 580549 23748
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163477 94 6054 6149 -95 165200 96305 68895 604297 682399 -78102
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163491 94 6054 8844 -2790 165200 159882 5318 604297 701542 -97245
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163506 94 6054 6164 -110 165200 129591 35609 604297 597443 6854
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163508 94 6054 7222 -1168 165200 257386 -92186 604297 766844 -162547
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163741 94 6054 5523 531 165200 149091 16109 604297 473426 130871
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163759 94 6054 6160 -106 165200 170506 -5306 604297 624646 -20349
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163761 94 6054 5058 996 165200 39524 125676 604297 573663 30634
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163764 94 6054 6196 -142 165200 74347 90853 604297 684223 -79926
101
Manhours Material Costs Total Costs
1 NADEP TMS RWK BUNO FY Est Act Var Est Act Var Est Act Var
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163769 94 6054 5822 232 165200 193313 -28113 653399 620610 32789
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163992 94 6054 6228 -174 165200 172408 -7208 604297 594775 9522
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163998 94 6054 5891 163 165200 166375 -1175 604297 539881 64416
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164012 94 6054 4999 1055 165200 348066 -182866 604297 486132 118165
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164013 94 6054 6884 -830 165200 159593 5607 604297 761052 -156755
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161354 95 5303 4565 738 158995 99461 59534 554281 354742 199539
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161740 95 5303 4363 940 158995 79463 79532 554281 396465 157816
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161938 95 5303 5217 86 158995 67499 91496 554281 360299 193982
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161947 95 5303 4067 1236 158995 25043 133952 554281 374700 179581
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162452 95 5303 6673 -1370 158995 103000 55995 554281 538973 15308
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162834 95 5303 5769 -466 158995 133903 25092 554281 453915 100366
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162835 95 5303 5930 -627 158995 57498 101497 554281 524979 29302
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162860 95 5303 7179 -1876 158995 86615 72380 554281 599890 -45609
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163156 95 5303 4509 794 158995 79396 79599 554281 324830 229451
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163432 95 5303 6350 -1047 158995 84530 74465 554281 421929 132352
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163433 95 5303 4960 343 158995 30128 128867 554281 407967 146314
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163450 95 5303 5239 64 158995 97168 61827 554281 372478 181803
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163455 95 5303 5282 21 158995 73386 85609 554281 451186 103095
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163459 95 5303 5394 -91 158995 83464 75531 554281 390369 163912
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163469 95 5303 5846 -543 158995 29424 129571 554281 415393 138888
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163480 95 5303 5461 -158 158995 104859 54136 554281 425729 128552
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163483 95 5303 2322 2981 158995 39238 119757 554281 315023 239258
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163490 95 5303 4882 421 158995 46572 112423 554281 426900 127381
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163502 95 5303 5291 12 158995 38879 120116 554281 445901 108380
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163504 95 5303 4605 698 158995 35705 123290 554281 359258 195023
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163505 95 5303 4493 810 158995 36981 122014 554281 359942 194339
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163509 95 5303 5485 -182 158995 32042 126953 554281 434584 119697
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163743 95 5303 3859 1444 158995 54844 104151 554281 327161 227120
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163745 95 5303 4027 1276 158995 62752 96243 554281 371677 182604
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163748 95 5303 6551 -1248 158995 43225 115770 554281 447400 106881
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163752 95 5303 3858 1445 158995 37265 121730 554281 323790 230491
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163758 95 5303 5502 -199 158995 80128 78867 554281 442259 112022
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163762 95 5303 6549 -1246 158995 75552 83443 554281 488244 66037
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163766 95 5303 5708 -405 158995 77769 81226 554281 512564 41717
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163782 95 5303 4291 1012 158995 60184 98811 554281 313961 240320
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163996 95 5303 5536 -233 158995 38048 120947 554281 437920 116361
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163999 95 5303 5129 174 158995 25886 133109 554281 429969 124312
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164007 95 5303 4576 727 158995 72592 86403 554281 333686 220595
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164008 95 5303 5129 174 158995 31279 127716 554281 453181 101100
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164016 95 5303 4207 1096 158995 29351 129644 554281 371561 182720
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164023 95 5303 4224 1079 158995 50108 108887 554281 314383 239898
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164025 95 5303 4406 897 158995 33021 125974 554281 399842 154439
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162396 96 4900 4267 633 155950 106756 49194 407467 423040 -15573
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162408 96 4900 5640 -740 155950 109268 46682 407467 386192 21275
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162844 96 4900 5382 -482 155950 120212 35738 407467 384109 23358
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163141 96 4900 5617 -717 155950 109307 46643 407467 511484 -104017
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163158 96 4900 5145 -245 155950 127584 28366 407467 502695 -95228
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163457 96 4900 6560 -1660 155950 82972 72978 407467 568474 -161007
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163487 96 4900 5254 -354 155950 62489 93461 407467 404632 2835
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163489 96 4900 5334 -434 155950 121197 34753 407467 484835 -77368
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163493 96 4900 6176 -1276 155950 107641 48309 407467 546229 -138762
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163716 96 4900 4338 562 155950 104594 51356 407467 386994 20473
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NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163727 96 4900 4711 189 155950 96485 59465 407467 441663 -34196
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163755 96 4900 6144 -1244 155950 118052 37898 407467 541206 -133739
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163760 96 4900 6222 -1322 155950 97918 58032 407467 464629 -57162
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163767 96 4900 6230 -1330 155950 109483 46467 407467 448636 -41169
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163768 96 4900 6153 -1253 155950 132497 23453 407467 563054 -155587
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163778 96 4900 4158 742 155950 110985 44965 407467 422115 -14648
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163781 96 4900 4734 166 155950 40990 114960 407467 279148 128319
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164062 96 4900 5867 -967 155950 85422 70528 407467 511059 -103592
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164067 96 4900 5300 -400 155950 114839 41111 407467 507274 -99807
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164197 96 4900 5390 -490 155950 89599 66351 407467 428791 -21324
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164215 96 4900 4605 295 155950 77080 78870 407467 325752 81715
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164235 96 4900 4761 139 155950 63842 92108 407467 379181 28286
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162900 97 5110 4829 281 142100 107877 34223 499596 416243 83353
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164049 97 5110 3248 1862 142100 64339 77761 499596 277879 221717
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163726 97 5110 3959 1151 142100 109726 32374 499596 365326 134270
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164221 97 5110 2921 2189 142100 98903 43197 499596 287325 212271
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164240 97 5110 3193 1917 142100 67402 74698 499596 275584 224012
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164048 97 5110 2698 2412 142100 104200 37900 499596 279440 220156
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164051 97 5110 2851 2259 142100 89546 52554 499596 275398 224198
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164693 97 5110 2666 2444 142100 62619 79481 499596 239867 259729
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163987 97 5110 2492 2618 142100 89165 52935 499596 253595 246001
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163699 97 5110 2723 2387 142100 75279 66821 499596 247558 252038
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164204 97 5110 3032 2078 142100 104810 37290 499596 299018 200578
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164202 97 5110 3285 1825 142100 118195 23905 499596 327619 171977
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164041 97 5110 2809 2301 142100 109714 32386 499596 293579 206017
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164048 97 5110 3140 1970 142100 84504 57596 499596 285398 214198
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163773 97 5110 2353 2757 142100 109847 32253 499596 259036 240560
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163701 97 5110 3458 1652 142100 119051 23049 499596 334908 164688
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164230 97 5110 3728 1382 142100 133630 8470 499596 359891 139705
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164205 97 5110 3720 1390 142100 121660 20440 499596 346574 153022
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163715 97 5110 4009 1101 142100 149524 -7424 499596 389913 109683
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162899 97 5110 3592 1518 142100 149346 -7246 499596 363455 136141
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164209 97 5110 2967 2143 142100 107853 34247 499596 290118 209478
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164639 97 5110 3094 2016 142100 86082 56018 499596 272245 227351
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163135 97 5110 3470 1640 142100 143538 -1438 499596 350553 149043
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162871 97 5110 3837 1273 142100 136303 5797 499596 369559 130037
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164210 97 5110 3033 2077 142100 86471 55629 499596 276428 223168
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164227 97 5110 3394 1716 142100 129870 12230 499596 336380 163216
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164225 97 5110 3746 1364 142100 144650 -2550 499596 370359 129237
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164645 97 5110 3169 1941 142100 89372 52728 499596 286441 213155
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164636 97 5110 2861 2249 142100 99533 42567 499596 279414 220182
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164225 97 5402 3814 1588 142100 162200 -20100 520024 404168 115856
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164648 97 5402 3174 2228 142100 71166 70934 520024 275027 244997
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164047 97 5402 3122 2280 142100 97516 44584 520024 293915 226109
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164059 97 5402 3650 1752 142100 99781 42319 520024 340943 179081
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164223 97 5402 3434 1968 142100 111236 30864 520024 339613 180411
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164682 97 5402 2819 2583 142100 70849 71251 520024 263966 256058
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164222 97 5402 3085 2317 142100 123336 18764 520024 339461 180563
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164021 97 5402 3414 1988 142100 94186 47914 520024 328136 191888
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164055 97 5402 3331 2071 142100 125675 16425 520024 360132 159892
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162873 97 5402 3784 1618 142100 91893 50207 520024 358292 161732
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164218 97 5402 3427 1975 142100 87518 54582 520024 329868 190156
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NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164268 97 5402 4041 1361 142100 102110 39990 520024 380860 139164
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164050 97 5402 3510 1892 142100 116038 26062 520024 361877 158147
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164253 97 5402 3085 2317 142100 139413 2687 520024 362008 158016
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162470 97 5402 3596 1806 142100 121071 21029 520024 372445 147579
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164268 97 5402 3057 2345 142100 85120 56980 520024 290172 229852
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161924 97 5402 3617 1785 142100 159794 -17694 520024 406349 113675
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164258 97 5402 2698 2704 142100 193653 -51553 520024 375465 144559
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164635 97 5402 3227 2175 142100 44404 97696 520024 274318 245706
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164277 97 5402 3496 1906 142100 144036 -1936 520024 388160 131864
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164250 97 5402 3284 2118 142100 168190 -26090 520024 396905 123119
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162880 97 5402 4018 1384 142100 121576 20524 520024 385329 134695
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162853 97 5402 3660 1742 142100 119641 22459 520024 363665 156359
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164275 97 5402 3402 2000 142100 134576 7524 520024 365652 154372
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162428 97 5402 3882 1520 142100 175900 -33800 520024 438483 81541
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164668 97 5402 3013 2389 142100 95571 46529 520024 300692 219332
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 162438 97 5402 4331 1071 142100 93915 48185 520024 387321 132703
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164033 97 5402 3302 2100 142100 75063 67037 520024 299185 220839
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164255 97 5402 3003 2399 142100 104281 37819 520024 311360 208664
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164638 97 5402 3010 2392 142100 105317 36783 520024 312459 207565
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164274 97 5402 3144 2258 142100 125448 16652 520024 340182 179842
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164261 97 5402 2997 2405 142100 92642 49458 520024 297344 222680
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164036 97 5402 3259 2143 142100 101166 40934 520024 325048 194976
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163706 97 5402 2826 2576 142100 58319 83781 520024 255604 264420
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 161967 97 5402 3230 2172 142100 117500 24600 520024 337746 182278
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 164654 98 5402 2876 2526 111519 155365 -43846 467079 353404 113675
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163444 98 5402 3710 1692 111519 216808 -105289 467079 467700 -621
NORIS F/A18 MCAP 163993 98 5402 3200 2202 111519 127903 -16384 467079 347739 119340
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